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Beyond War: Bin Laden, Escobar, and 
the Justification of Targeted Killing 
Luis E. Chiesa* 
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt∗∗ 
Abstract 
Using the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden as a case 
study, this Article contributes to the debate on targeted killing in 
two distinct ways, each of which has the result of downplaying the 
centrality of international humanitarian law (IHL) as the decisive 
source of justification for targeted killings. 
First, we argue that the IHL rules governing the killing of 
combatants in wartime should be understood to apply more 
strictly in cases involving the targeting of single individuals, 
particularly when the targeting occurs against nonparadigmatic 
combatants outside the traditional battlefield. As applied to the 
bin Laden killing, we argue that the best interpretation of IHL 
would have required the SEALs to capture bin Laden in 
conditions short of surrender, if he was in fact manifestly 
defenseless or otherwise could have been readily captured with 
little risk. 
Second, we take seriously the possibility that the law should 
tolerate some targeted killings under conditions that are justified 
neither by reference to IHL nor by reference to the traditional 
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justifications available in peacetime. Drawing upon the example 
of Colombian crime family leader Pablo Escobar, who died in a 
police raid in 1993 in circumstances suggesting the authorities 
were not interested in capture, we suggest that targeted killings in 
these circumstances may be morally—if not legally—justified 
when (1) killing the targeted individual will protect society from a 
serious threat, (2) the individual is undeniably culpable for past 
atrocities, and (3) trying the individual is either logistically 
impossible or extraordinarily dangerous. 
Although we conclude that the bin Laden killing does not 
clearly satisfy the third criterion, this model nevertheless 
provides—in important ways—a superior framework for 
understanding public responses to bin Laden’s death than does 
the war paradigm. 
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I. Introduction 
On the evening of Sunday, May 1, 2011, President Barack 
Obama appeared on television to announce that a United States 
operation had killed Osama bin Laden following a raid upon the 
al Qaeda leader’s secret home in Abbottabad, Pakistan.1 In the 
United States, the news that the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks 
had finally been taken down after a decade of false leads and 
                                                                                                     
 1. See President Barack Obama, Osama Bin Laden Dead, THE WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (May 2, 2011, 11:35 p.m.), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (transcribing 
President Obama’s address) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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intelligence failures was met, understandably, with widespread 
jubilation, and crowds gathered in New York City and 
Washington, D.C., to celebrate the event.2 As the New York Times 
reported the following morning, “Bin Laden’s demise is a defining 
moment in the American-led fight against terrorism, a symbolic 
stroke affirming the relentlessness of the pursuit of those who 
attacked New York and Washington on Sept. 11, 2001.”3 
News reports in subsequent days and weeks revealed 
additional details of the suspenseful operation against bin Laden: 
A Navy SEAL team flew clandestinely by helicopter deep into 
Pakistan and undertook its mission by cover of night in a 
sprawling compound.4 Analysts debated the significance of the 
killing for future anti-terrorism efforts and the implications for 
the United States’ relationship with Pakistan, given the startling 
revelation that bin Laden was not hiding in the remote tribal 
areas of the Northwest, where Pakistan has struggled to 
establish control, but in an affluent suburb only thirty miles 
outside Islamabad.5 
Comparatively little public attention, at least inside the 
United States, has focused on the killing’s legality.6 Was the 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Peter Baker et al., Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 2011, at A1 (describing the American public’s reaction to President 
Obama’s announcement of bin Laden’s death). For a more detailed summary of 
existing reports of the operation, see Beth Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama 
Bin Laden & Anwar Al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory, 14 Y.B. INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 255, 258–60 (2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See How the Raid Unfolded, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/02/world/asia/abbottabad-map-of-
where-osama-bin-laden-was-killed.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Osama Bin Laden’s Death: How It 
Happened, BBC, (June 7, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-
13257330 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden, NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2011, at 
34, 35 (providing a detailed account of the mission and its planning). 
 5. See Schmidle, supra note 4, at 36 (describing American efforts to locate 
bin Laden in Pakistan since 2001 and stating “it remains unclear how [bin 
Laden] ended up living in Abbottabad”). 
 6. Although some members of the human rights community voiced 
objections, the raid sparked substantially more public criticism abroad. See 
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, JUSTICE AND THE ENEMY: NUREMBERG, 9/11, AND THE TRIAL 
OF KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED 194–200 (2011) (discussing international human 
rights organizations’ reactions to the bin Laden killing). 
BEYOND WAR 1375 
killing an exercise of individual self-defense on the part of Navy 
SEALs? Or were U.S. forces operating under more permissive 
rules of engagement that did not require bin Laden to pose an 
immediate threat? In his speech to the nation, the President did 
not address these questions explicitly. To the extent his remarks 
provided an answer, they gave mixed signals.7 On the one hand, 
President Obama emphasized the gravity of the al Qaeda leader’s 
criminality and appeared to portray the mission as an exercise in 
criminal justice. Bin Laden was “the leader of al Qaeda, and a 
terrorist who’s responsible for the murder of thousands of 
innocent men, women, and children.”8 The operation the 
President authorized was one “to get bin Laden and bring him to 
justice,” and by his killing, the President could “say to those 
families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has 
been done.”9 The President struck a similar chord in a television 
interview the following week, in which he explained that “the one 
thing I didn’t lose sleep over was the possibility of taking bin 
Laden out. Justice was done. And I think that anyone who would 
question that the perpetrator of mass murder on American soil 
didn’t deserve what he got needs to have their head examined.”10 
Few could doubt the President’s assessment of bin Laden’s 
individual desert, but desert alone does not supply a justification 
for killing. The law, after all, generally does not authorize law-
enforcement officials to kill dangerous criminals in lieu of a 
criminal trial conducted in accordance with due process of law.11 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Obama, supra note 1 (recounting bin Laden’s role in the 9/11 
attacks, efforts to track bin Laden, and Obama’s order “to get Osama bin Laden 
and bring him to justice” but not addressing any legal grounds supporting the 
killing). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Killing Bin Laden: The President’s Story, 60 MINUTES (CBS television 
broadcast May 8, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id= 
7365396n&tag=mncol;lst;10. 
 11. In U.S. law, this prohibition finds expression in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV 
(codifying due process rights). At the international level, equivalent protections 
are found in major human rights treaties among other sources. See NILS 
MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91–139 (2008) (analyzing 
protections found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and the European Convention 
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Accordingly, killing by law-enforcement officials is generally only 
permitted on urgent preventive grounds, to deflect an imminent 
lethal threat to self or others, or to prevent a dangerous suspect’s 
escape.12  
In his speech, the President also indicated a separate 
consideration that has significant legal implications: the United 
States was at “war against al Qaeda to protect our citizens, our 
friends, and our allies.”13 Although the discourse of war received 
only passing mention in this context, it assumed prominence in 
later days as administration officials more explicitly addressed 
the legality of the bin Laden killing. In a May 19, 2011 blog post 
on the international law blog Opinio Juris, State Department 
Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh relied exclusively on the law 
regulating the conduct of war—the “law of war” in U.S. legal 
terminology, or international humanitarian law (IHL) in the 
terminology of international law—to justify the operation against 
bin Laden.14 He noted that, following 9/11, Congress authorized 
the use of force against al Qaeda, and he referred to the current 
existence of an “armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
associated forces.”15 Pursuant to the applicable rules of war, 
argued Koh, U.S. forces were permitted to kill bin Laden as an 
enemy combatant without prior due process because he had not 
affirmatively provided a “genuine offer of surrender that [was] 
clearly communicated . . . and received by the opposing force, 
                                                                                                     
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), along 
with relevant authority). 
 12. See infra Part III (discussing permissive killings); MELZER, supra note 
11, at 232 (providing the circumstances, based on a review of international legal 
sources, in which lethal force may be used). Melzer concludes that “[a]s a 
general rule, potentially lethal force should not be used except to: (1) defend any 
person against an imminent threat of death or serious injury, (2) prevent the 
perpetration of particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, or 
(3) arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting arrest, or to prevent 
his or her escape.” Id. 
 13. Obama, supra note 1. 
 14. Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against 
Osama bin Laden, OPINIO JURIS (May 19, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://opinionjuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us-operation-against-osama- 
bin-laden/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (setting forth grounds for the legality of 
bin Laden’s killing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. Id.  
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under circumstances where it [was] feasible for the opposing force 
to accept that offer of surrender.”16  
The invocation of the more permissive approach to killing 
applicable in wartime raises its own set of questions, concerning 
whether the war paradigm applies and which rules of 
engagement this body of law permits. The tension revealed in 
Obama’s speech—between bin Laden as a criminal suspect and 
bin Laden as an enemy combatant—is emblematic of the broader 
difficulties raised in recent years by the practice of targeted 
killing as a component of the United States’ efforts to combat al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, and by 
Israel’s counterterrorism efforts in the West Bank and Gaza.17 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. Subsequent statements by U.S. government officials have expanded 
upon the legal basis of U.S. targeted-killing policy without impacting this aspect 
of the basis for the bin Laden killing. See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., 
Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (maintaining that the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen 
terrorist is lawful if: “. . . the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation 
would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); John O. Brennan, Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of 
the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Remarks to the Wilson Center (Sept. 
6, 2012), available at http://www.wilson center.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-
us-counterterrorism-strategy (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (stating that certain 
“targeted strikes are legal,” ethical, and wise under international and U.S. law 
and policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jeh Charles 
Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., National Security Law, Lawyers and 
Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Address at Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 
2012), available at http://ylsmediaserv.law.yale.edu/netcasts/2012/YLSThomas 
Johnson022212.mp3 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (summarizing “some of the basic 
legal principles that form the basis for the U.S. military's counterterrorism efforts 
against Al Qaeda and its associated forces”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 17. Recent academic literature addressing these issues is substantial. For 
selected works of particular relevance to this Article, see generally TARGETED 
KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD (Claire Finkelstein, 
Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012); MELZER, supra note 11; 
Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. 145 (2010); Michael L. Gross, Assassination and Targeted Killing: 
Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 323 (2006); 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE 
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Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann have aptly summarized how 
this emerging practice has tested the intuitions underlying the 
traditional legal paradigms that regulate the conditions under 
which governments may kill individuals as exercises of either law 
enforcement or war powers: 
A targeted killing entails an entire military operation that is 
planned and executed against a particular, known person. In 
war, there is no prohibition on the killing of a known enemy 
combatant; for the most part, wars are fought between 
anonymous soldiers, and bullets have no designated names on 
them. The image of a powerful army launching a highly 
sophisticated guided missile from a distance, often from a 
Predator drone, against a specific individual driving an 
unarmored vehicle or walking down the street starkly 
illustrates the difference between counterinsurgency 
operations and the traditional war paradigm. Moreover, the 
fact that all targeted killing operations in combating terrorism 
are directed against particular individuals makes the tactic 
more reminiscent of a law enforcement paradigm, where power 
is employed on the basis of individual guilt rather than status 
(civilian/combatant). Unlike a law enforcement operation, 
however, there are no due process guarantees: the individual 
is not forewarned about the operation, is not given a chance to 
defend his innocence, and there is no assessment of his guilt 
by any impartial body.18 
We do not attempt in this Article to resolve every problem 
associated with targeted killing. Nor do we attempt a definitive 
answer regarding the legality of bin Laden’s killing itself. 
However, the circumstances surrounding bin Laden’s demise 
bring into sharp focus the war paradigm’s limits as a justifying 
framework for the evolving practice of targeted killing. In this 
respect, this Article contributes to the debate on targeted killing 
in two distinct ways, both of which have the result of 
downplaying the war paradigm as the decisive justification for 
targeted killing. 
                                                                                                     
IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed.) (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense 
Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in 
Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237 (2010); Daniel Statman, Targeted 
Killing, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179 (2004); Van Schaack, supra note 2. 
 18. Blum & Heymann, supra note 17, at 147–48.  
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In Part II, we argue that IHL, assuming it applies, does not 
play the decisive role in justifying targeted killing that is often 
assumed.19 The problem here is twofold. First, there is 
indeterminacy in IHL itself. It remains unclear how the 
requirements of IHL—in particular, the overarching mandate 
that killing pursue military necessity—apply to operations, such 
as the bin Laden killing, whose functional requirements do not 
resemble those traditionally associated with the battlefield, but 
rather mirror those of traditional law-enforcement operations.20 
Second, the problem of targeted killing exposes a deeper 
uncertainty about the moral status of IHL. At its root, IHL is a 
body of law that relaxes the deep-seated rule against murder.21 
Its expanded permission to kill most plausibly reflects realism in 
the face of the historical inevitability of war rather than a fully 
developed moral justification for killing.22 Because of this feature 
of IHL, the possibility that other law might similarly evolve to 
accommodate expanded forms of killing outside the war paradigm 
cannot be ruled out. However, it also urges deep caution with 
respect to the interpretation and the application of IHL in 
nonparadigmatic cases.  
These considerations justify the intuition—reflected already, 
to a degree, in both U.S. policy23 and Israeli judicial doctrine24—
that the rules governing killing should be stricter in cases 
involving the targeted killing of single individuals, particularly 
when the targeting occurs against nonparadigmatic combatants 
outside the traditional battlefield. They also indicate that IHL’s 
                                                                                                     
 19. See infra Part II (discussing moral and legal justifications for targeted 
killing in war). 
 20. See infra Part II.C (discussing the difficulties of applying traditional 
criteria for targeting killing to the circumstances involving bin Laden). 
 21. See MELZER, supra note 11, at 74–81 (defining basic principles of IHL 
and the legal framework it provides for justifying targeted killings). 
 22. See infra Part II.A (discussing how IHL’s justification for killing 
illustrates the law’s adapting to real needs).  
 23. See, e.g., Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of 
Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1 (outlining 
President Obama’s stipulations for targeted killing). 
 24. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel 
paras. 18–23 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ 
Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (recognizing the need to balance 
humanitarian considerations against military need).  
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generally expansive approach to killing is inappropriate in 
operations that are not supported by functional requirements or 
reasons that plausibly sound in military advantage.25  
Although these considerations alone cannot tell us whether it 
was permissible to kill bin Laden under the circumstances—
much depends on facts that may never be known—they do call 
into question the breadth of the standard that the State 
Department applied in justifying the killing. It is not enough, we 
argue, to establish that bin Laden was a combatant engaged in 
armed conflict against the United States who had not 
affirmatively and clearly surrendered under conditions that 
would have facilitated a safe capture. We argue that the best 
interpretation of IHL required an attempt to capture bin Laden 
absent surrender unless the decision to kill in lieu of capture was 
justified by recourse to conventional understandings of military 
advantage, was in fact motivated by the pursuit of military 
advantage, and would have spared U.S. military personnel from 
risks greater than those generally expected of law-enforcement 
officials acting under like circumstances.26 Although it is correct, 
as commentators have noted, that IHL does not impose any 
general duty to capture non-surrendering combatants, the 
requirements we identify are implied in other rules of IHL and, 
more deeply, by the structure of IHL itself.27 
The remainder of the Article takes seriously the possibility 
that the law should tolerate some targeted killings under 
conditions that are justified neither by reference to an armed 
conflict nor by reference to the traditional parameters of the law-
enforcement paradigm. Part III explores the limits of existing 
legal categories rooted in self-defense, lesser-evils, and law-
enforcement authority as frameworks for justifying targeted 
killings.28 In Part IV, we identify what we believe to be one of the 
                                                                                                     
 25. See infra Part II.B (discussing the importance of military necessity to 
justify targeted killing). 
 26. See infra Part V.D (laying out criteria to justify killing rather than 
capture). 
 27. See infra Part II.B (arguing that IHL implicitly requires a duty of 
capture in some cases). 
 28. See infra Part III (discussing legal grounds for targeted killing outside 
of war, including defense of self or others, law enforcement, and a necessary or 
lesser evil). 
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most persuasive cases for justifying targeted killing beyond the 
currently accepted paradigms: that of late Colombian crime 
family leader Pablo Escobar, who died in a police raid in 1993 in 
circumstances suggesting the authorities were not interested in 
capture.29 As we explore in Part V, we are uncertain whether the 
lessons of the Escobar killing can or should be reduced to a 
judicially enforceable legal standard, but the intuition that 
Colombian authorities would have acted justifiably in ordering 
the killing is supported by three features that distinguish 
Escobar from other criminal suspects.30 First, at the time of his 
death, he remained a dangerous individual who posed 
demonstrable dangers to Colombian society and was almost 
certain to continue his involvement in serious crimes.31 Second, 
he was unquestionably guilty of horrendous crimes that rank 
among the worst of the late twentieth century.32 Third, his track 
record—including the murder of incorruptible judges and his 
prior escape from confinement—indicated that it was infeasible 
and unacceptably dangerous to try him.33 
Might these criteria that support the killing of Escobar 
likewise justify the killing of Osama bin Laden? We think not. As 
we explain in Part VI, although the bin Laden case mirrors 
Escobar’s in the combination of grave, unquestionable guilt and 
continuing danger, the obstacles to trial remain speculative and 
lack the demonstrable urgency witnessed by the case of Escobar, 
who, by the time of his death, had already established a track 
record of corrupting and murdering the officials whom the legal 
system relied on to bring him to justice.34 There is no parallel in 
the case of bin Laden, and to justify his killing based on the more 
generalized fear that a trial would bring security risks would 
create a dangerous slippery slope. 
                                                                                                     
 29. See infra Part IV (discussing the killing of Pablo Escobar as well as 
reactions to and justifications for the killing). 
 30. See infra Part V (analyzing what Escobar’s killing teaches about the 
morality of targeted killing and its justifications). 
 31. See infra Part IV.A (describing Escobar’s threat to the justice system). 
 32. See infra Part IV.A (describing Escobar’s crimes). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See infra Part VI (comparing Escobar and bin Laden and considering 
whether justifications for killing Escobar extend to bin Laden’s killing). 
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Nevertheless, the Escobar precedent remains relevant to 
the bin Laden killing. As a descriptive matter, we believe that 
the Escobar precedent better explains the public reception of bin 
Laden’s killing—if not the government’s actual motives—than 
does a focus on wartime hostilities. In other words, the reason 
why bin Laden’s killing occasioned so little debate in the United 
States is that the public saw bin Laden much as the President 
presented him in his May 1 speech: not simply or even primarily 
as a military opponent, but as a dangerous and deeply culpable 
criminal.35 As a normative matter, moreover, the Escobar 
precedent arguably provides a superior—if ultimately 
unsuccessful—argument for why, assuming bin Laden could 
have been readily captured at minimal risk, it was nevertheless 
appropriate to kill him. Finally, Escobar’s case is informative for 
understanding the bin Laden killing as a precedent, one that 
may point toward a developing law in action that justifies a 
limited set of targeted killings based on considerations of 
culpability and danger, rather than a connection to armed 
conflict.  
Although we are concerned about where this precedent 
could lead and would sharply limit the evolving law to privilege 
criminal trials whenever feasible, there is also value to speaking 
honestly about the possible bases of government action. The 
temptation to rely on IHL to justify targeted killings 
understandably derives from the fact that this is the body of law 
that makes it easiest to justify killing. But relying on IHL comes 
with the risk that states will expansively interpret that body of 
law so as to justify policies that have little basis in the values or 
functional requirements that initially gave rise to IHL. If 
governments are in fact looking to culpability considerations in 
developing policies of targeted killing, then there is value to 
considering the circumstances under which such policies might 
be justified and to debating concrete cases pursuant to the 
criteria that are likely of most relevance to decision makers. 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Obama, supra note 1 (“[B]in Laden has been al Qaeda’s leader and 
symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends 
and allies.”). 
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II. Justifying Targeted Killing in War 
When people debate the legality of targeted killings, they 
usually have in mind one or more cases that they believe 
represent core examples of the practice. A common case—call it 
TK 1—takes place in the theater of war and invokes IHL36 to 
justify the killing.37 As a general matter, the world’s legal 
systems forbid the intentional killing of individuals except in 
narrowly defined circumstances, such as when necessary to 
prevent the imminent use of lethal force by a wrongdoer.38 But if 
TK 1 cases are properly subject to IHL, the legal landscape 
changes considerably. Pursuant to these war rules, the norm 
against killing is remarkably relaxed. Provided that a number of 
status-based requirements are met, combatants in armed 
conflicts are permitted to use lethal force against their opponents 
in ways that would otherwise violate the peacetime prohibition 
against murder. When combatants aim to kill their opponents, 
there is no requirement that those targeted pose an imminent 
threat, or indeed pose any sort of direct threat beyond their 
participation in the broader war effort.39 As Michael Walzer has 
                                                                                                     
 36. See MELZER, supra note 11, at 74–81 (defining basic principles of IHL 
and the legal framework it provides for analyzing targeted killings). 
 37. See id. at 55–58 (discussing the application of IHL to justify targeted 
killing in conflicts). 
 38. See infra Part III (addressing the scope of permissible killing in 
peacetime). 
 39. See, e.g., Blum & Heymann, supra note 17, at 146 (“[T]he enemy 
combatants belong to another identifiable party and are killed not because they 
are guilty, but because they are potentially lethal agents of that hostile party.”). 
The core international rules governing the conduct of hostilities are laid out in 
the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. See Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (providing, inter alia, rules 
governing the conduct of hostilities). Even for states such as the United States 
and Israel, which have not ratified the treaty, these rules are generally 
recognized to reflect requirements of customary international law. See Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
¶ 75 (July 8) (noting that “[t]he provisions of the Additional Protocols of 1977 
give expression and attest to the unity and complexity” of the “large number of 
customary rules [that] have been developed by the practice of States”); id. ¶ 78 
(summarizing “[t]he cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the 
fabric of humanitarian law”); HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel 
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put it, the law of war permits the killing of “naked soldiers,” those 
who, for example, are eating their breakfast or are asleep in their 
beds.40 The potential for combatants to be attacked derives from 
the general danger posed by their status.41 So long as hostilities 
persist, the potential to be killed terminates only upon a 
combatant becoming incapacitated—or “hors de combat”—on 
account of his falling into the power of an adverse party; his 
clearly expressed surrender; or his being rendered unconscious or 
“otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness” such that he is 
“incapable of defending himself.”42 
Civilians, by contrast, may not be targeted “unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities,”43 and the 
intentional targeting of civilians is a war crime under 
international law.44 Nor may belligerents employ weapons or 
                                                                                                     
v. Gov’t of Israel ¶ 4 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/ 
02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (stating that Additional Protocol I “reflects the 
norms of customary international law, which obligate Israel”); see, e.g., JEAN-
MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 72 (2005) (mentioning an Israel–Lebanon ceasefire 
understanding relying on customary international law principles and outlining 
rules of customary international law governing the conduct of hostilities). 
 40. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT 
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 138 (1977) (“The first principle of the war 
convention is that, once war has begun, soldiers are subject to attack at any 
time (unless they are wounded or captured).”); Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable 
Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 71 (2010) (noting that “[t]he existing 
interpretation of the laws of war supports Walzer’s conclusion” that a soldier 
stripped naked and swimming in the lake is a legitimate target during an armed 
conflict); Yoram Dinstein, The System of Status Groups in International 
Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW 
CHALLENGES: SYMPOSIUM IN THE HONOUR OF KNUT IPSEN 144, 148 (Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007) (“[O]rdinary 
combatants . . . can be attacked (and killed) wherever they are, in and out of 
uniform: even when they are not on active duty. There is no prohibition either of 
opening fire on retreating troops (who have not surrendered) or of targeting 
individual combatants.”). 
 41. See Blum, supra note 40, at 71 (stating that one’s liability to attack is 
based on his or her status as a combatant).  
 42. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 41. Thus, IHL prohibits the 
denial of quarter, including orders that there shall be no survivors. Id. art. 40; 
see also MELZER, supra note 11, at 367–71 (discussing the IHL rule against 
denial of quarter). 
 43. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 51(3). 
 44. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
8(2)(b)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (declaring that “[i]ntentionally 
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means of warfare that are indiscriminate or that cause 
unnecessary suffering.45 Even so, civilians are also subject to 
reduced protection under the war rules. When combatants attack 
military targets, they may do so knowing that their actions will 
kill civilians, so long as the anticipated loss of civilian life is not 
disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage.46 
These rules apply equally to all sides in conflict, without 
distinction based on whether the party invoking IHL is supported 
by a just cause.47 Thus, the rules are the same even if the killers 
are invaders engaged in an illegal aggressive conquest, and their 
opponents have taken up arms justly because self-defense 
requires it. In the case of international armed conflicts covered by 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, states are affirmatively 
prohibited from criminally prosecuting as murderers those who 
have complied with IHL’s requirements.48 No corresponding 
                                                                                                     
directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual 
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” is a war crime). 
 45. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, arts. 35(2), 51(4).  
 46. See id. art. 51(5)(b) (stating that attacks should be considered 
indiscriminate if it “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated”). 
 47. See id. pmbl. (applying this protocol “without any adverse distinction 
based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by 
or attributed to the Parties to the conflict”). Here as well, these rules are more 
permissive than those generally enforced by the criminal law. A bank robber 
who kills a police officer in self-defense may not justify the killing if the police 
officer herself was justified in using lethal force against the robber under the 
circumstances. See WALZER, supra note 40 at 127–28 (offering this hypothetical). 
Yet precisely such a privilege attaches to those who, fighting an illegal war of 
aggression, kill enemy combatants who fight a just war of self-defense. See id. at 
128 (“The moral equality of the battlefield distinguishes combat from domestic 
crime.”). 
 48. This immunity appears, among other places, in the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Pursuant to Article 87, 
“[p]risoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts 
of the Detaining Power to any penalties except those provided for in respect of 
members of the armed forces of the said Power who have committed the same 
acts.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 87, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention]. 
Article 99 in turn provides that “[n]o prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced 
for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by 
international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.” Id. art. 99. 
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combatant privilege applies in the case of internal armed conflicts 
(thus, governments may invoke their domestic laws to prosecute 
rebels for their rebellion), but even here the Second Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions endorses “the broadest 
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed 
conflict.”49  
In light of this extraordinary permission that IHL affords, it 
is unsurprising that the legal debate over the United States’ 
targeted killing policy has focused predominantly on whether and 
how this body of law applies.50 These are the rules that the 
United States has invoked to justify its targeted killing policies in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, and as already noted, to 
justify the specific targeting of bin Laden.51 Similarly, Israel’s 
Supreme Court invoked IHL when ruling on the permissibility of 
targeted killings in the West Bank and Gaza.52  
The invocation of IHL in these circumstances has triggered 
various points of controversy.53 One set of questions focuses on 
targeted killing’s jus ad bellum dimension. When the United 
                                                                                                     
As one U.S. court has noted, “[t]hese Articles, when read together, make clear 
that a belligerent in a war cannot prosecute the soldiers of its foes for the 
soldiers’ lawful acts of war.” United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 
(E.D. Va. 2002). 
 49. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) art. 6(5), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 50. See MELZER, supra note 11, at 262–69 (examining the U.S. 
government’s arguments that the war on terrorism falls outside of traditional 
categories of “conflict” and therefore is not governed by IHL). 
 51. See Koh, supra note 14 (using IHL’s framework, including its principles 
of distinction and proportionality, in arguing that the targeted killing of bin 
Laden was legal); Johnson, supra note 16 (discussing when targeted killing is 
legal); Holder, supra note 16 (stipulating conditions under which targeted 
killing is legal); Brennan, supra note 16 (discussing legal principles behind 
targeted killing). 
 52. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel 
para. 18 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/ 
02/690/007/ a34/02007690.a34.pdf (applying IHL to the armed conflicts in the 
West Bank and Gaza).  
 53. For a summary of the principal legal questions involved, see Philip 
Alston, U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, paras. 28–92, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies 
/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf [hereinafter Alston Report]. 
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States launches an attack against an individual residing in 
Pakistan or Yemen, does the attack represent a legitimate use of 
force, or is the United States committing an act of aggression 
against the territorial sovereignty of the state in which the attack 
has taken place?54 Another set of questions focuses on whether 
IHL is the operative body of law governing a particular killing, 
the central issue being whether the use of lethal force reflects a 
requisite nexus to an armed conflict (either international or non-
international in character).55 A third set of questions focuses on 
                                                                                                     
 54. See id. paras. 37–45 (describing the necessary conditions to allow a 
targeted attack on an individual in another state’s territory); Van Schaack, 
supra note 2, at 266–81 (surveying the jus ad bellum issues present in the 
killing of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Aulaqi); O’Connell, supra note 17, at 
13 (“The drones used in Pakistan are lawful for use only on the battlefield. The 
right to resort to them must be found in the jus ad bellum; the way they are 
used must be based on the jus in bello and human rights.”); Paust, supra note 
17, at 279 (concluding that, when acting in self-defense, a nation may attack 
non-state actors in another state without that state’s permission); Kenneth 
Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in 
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 369–70  
(Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009) (discussing the targeting of terrorist suspects 
without the territorial state’s consent). 
On this point, special attention has focused on the scope of the right to self-
defense under international law, considering that non-state actors are often 
killed across international borders. The ICJ has denied that such a right exists 
with respect to armed attacks by non-state actors that are not imputable to a 
state. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, paras. 138–39 (July 9) 
(refusing to apply the inherent self-defense right to permit armed attacks when 
the “attacks against [the U.N.-member state] are [not] imputable to a foreign 
State”); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, paras. 235–36 (Dec. 19) (stating that 
international responsibility only arises if injurious acts are imputed to a state). 
Current U.S. policy dictates that the use of force can be permissible in those 
circumstances, absent consent of the third state, provided the state is unable or 
unwilling to deal effectively with the threat to the United States posed by the 
non-state group. See Holder, supra note 16 (“[T]he use of force in foreign 
territory [without consent] would be consistent with these international legal 
principles . . . after a determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to 
deal effectively with a threat to the United States.”); Brennan, supra note 16 
(“There is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely piloted 
aircraft for this purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal force against our 
enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved 
consents or is unable or unwilling to take action . . . .”). 
 55. See Alston Report, supra note 53, paras. 46–56 (describing the existence 
and scope of an armed conflict); MELZER, supra note 11, at 76–81 (stating that 
“the applicability of IHL presupposes the existence of an international or non-
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whether the targets of attack—often un-uniformed individuals 
suspected of membership in terrorist groups—are in fact subject 
to attack under IHL, either because they have the status of 
combatants who may be targeted at any time or because they are 
civilians directly participating in hostilities when they are 
targeted.56 
These are vital questions whose resolution is critical to 
establishing both the permissibility of many targeted killings and 
the broader scope of anti-terrorism efforts. They are not, however, 
the primary focus of this Article. We will instead largely assume 
in this Part that IHL does in fact apply to bin Laden’s killing and 
to other instances of targeted killing. We nevertheless argue that 
IHL does not play as determinative a role in justifying targeted 
killing as the current debate would suggest. 
Subpart A strikes a cautionary note about the moral status of 
the IHL rules.57 Understood in its best light, the scope of the 
permission to kill in wartime does not reflect a fully developed 
moral framework for killing, but instead reflects a body of law 
that is largely reactive to the historical experience of warfare as 
an inevitable evil that can at best be regulated on the margins so 
                                                                                                     
international ‘armed conflict’”). The United States maintains that it is engaged 
in armed conflict with al Qaeda and that the conflict extends beyond the borders 
of Afghanistan. See Holder, supra note 16 (“Our legal authority is not limited to 
the battlefields in Afghanistan. . . . We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone 
to shifting operations from country to country.”); Johnson, supra note 16 (stating 
that the conflict against al Qaeda requires military authority for necessary and 
appropriate force to extend beyond the “‘hot’ battlefields of Afghanistan”); Koh, 
supra note 14 (acknowledging “our armed conflict with al Qaeda”). Thus far, the 
Obama Administration has not specified whether it considers this to be an 
international or non-international armed conflict. For a discussion about the 
complexities associated with both views, see Craig Martin, Going Medieval: 
Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, in TARGETED 
KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 223, 231 (Claire 
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (“There continues 
to be debate over the exact parameters of non-international armed conflict, 
which are relevant to the controversy over the validity of the claim that the 
United States is, as a matter of law, engaged in a ‘transnational armed conflict’ 
with [a]l Qaeda and others.” (citations omitted)). 
 56. See Blum & Heymann, supra note 17, at 146–47 (explaining that an 
attack on an individual not wearing a uniform but suspected of involvement in 
terrorism must be based on the target’s status as a combatant or as an agent of 
a hostile force). 
 57. See infra Part II.A (highlighting moral issues implicated by targeted 
killing and related international law). 
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as to temper its inhumanity. This animating feature of IHL 
cautions against efforts to interpret or expand the war rules to 
nonparadigmatic cases, but it also cannot preclude the possibility 
of such expansion. The law, after all, has already once 
accommodated the reality that states employ more permissive 
rules of killing than are generally permitted. 
Subpart B explores problems of application that arise when 
justifying targeted killings under IHL.58 Although the mere fact 
of combatants being individually targeted need not raise unique 
problems for IHL, the evolution of targeted killing as a distinct 
and significant method of warfare puts pressure on IHL, testing 
how the core legal requirements of necessity and discrimination 
apply to operations whose mechanics depart significantly from 
the types of combat that have traditionally informed IHL.  
Subpart C details how the killing of Osama bin Laden 
presents an especially difficult test case for the IHL rules given 
that the functional mechanics of the operation—an isolated raid 
on a single house in a noncombat area—resemble in many 
respects the types of operations associated with law 
enforcement.59 We are therefore skeptical that the scope of the 
permission to kill should depend upon whether we label the 
operation a wartime attack as opposed to, for example, an 
operation to apprehend an especially dangerous criminal. Our 
conclusion does not change, moreover, even assuming that the 
United States could have permissibly elected alternate, less 
discriminating means of killing bin Laden, such as by firing a 
missile from an unmanned aerial vehicle. 
A. The Morality of War and the Limits of International Law 
As we just described, to invoke IHL in order to justify 
targeted killing is to invoke a more permissive legal framework 
toward killing. Underlying, but often ignored, in the 
interpretation and application of IHL is a broader moral question 
concerning why the law recognizes multiple legal paradigms for 
                                                                                                     
 58. See infra Part II.B (discussing the application of IHL to targeted 
killings). 
 59. See infra Part II.C (examining the circumstances of bin Laden’s killing 
with respect to the IHL framework). 
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killing at the outset. If society maintains that killing is wrong 
except in very narrow circumstances—such as to prevent the 
imminent use of lethal force by a wrongdoer—why should our 
moral judgment change when dealing with wartime scenarios? 
Why, in particular, should combatants not be bound by the same 
rules that apply to law-enforcement officials in peacetime? The 
question is not merely theoretical, as evidenced by the ongoing 
debate over the application of IHL to targeted killing. Whether 
and how we apply IHL to borderline or nonparadigmatic cases 
should be informed, to some degree, by the moral arguments 
supporting IHL’s creation. 
Although the morality of killing in wartime is the central 
focus of multiple intellectual traditions, including just-war 
theory, the United Nations charter system, and, of course, IHL 
itself, the nature of the permission to kill in war remains, in 
many ways, perplexing.60 The conventional approach to justifying 
this state of affairs generally proceeds along the following lines: A 
state’s decision to employ the barbaric tactics of war must first be 
justified only by overriding interests of utmost importance, most 
paradigmatically the interest of self-defense against an armed 
attack by another state.61 The nature of this interest further 
necessitates, under strictly defined circumstances, the tactics 
commonly associated with warfare. A state facing an invading 
army will likely find it impossible to fend off the attack if it 
commits itself to rules of engagement that limit killing to the 
circumstances permitted by the law-enforcement paradigm.62 
                                                                                                     
 60. See JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 104–07 (2009) (discussing the 
conflation of morality and legality in the body of international law governing 
armed conflicts). 
 61. The right of self-defense is enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
which provides that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 62. This reasoning finds expression in customary international law’s 
general requirement that the use of armed force in self-defense be both 
necessary and proportionate, precluding the use of force beyond that necessary 
to repel an attack or restore the status quo ante. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. 
U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, para. 74 (Nov. 6) (“[W]hether the response to the [armed] 
attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and 
proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence.” (second alteration in 
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Therefore, IHL grants a broader permission to kill, albeit the 
permission is not absolute. Like the law-enforcement paradigm, 
IHL places certain non-negotiable limits on killing.63 However, it 
draws the line in a different, more permissive place. 
Those who accept justifications of this nature still have 
difficulty explaining why international law should embrace the 
strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, such 
that combatants fighting for illegal aggressors benefit from the 
same permissive rules that apply to those acting in legitimate 
self-defense. Walzer has defended this “moral equality of soldiers” 
by appealing to the moral intuition that it is unfair to blame 
soldiers merely for fighting wars on behalf of their state, when 
doing so reflects their “routine habits of law-abidingness, their 
fear, their patriotism, their moral investment in the state.”64 
Moreover, because most combatants will predictably perceive 
themselves to be fighting for the just side in war, a rule that 
privileges just combatants over unjust combatants could serve to 
increase the cruelty of war.65 There would be less incentive to 
comply with even minimal rules of humane treatment if 
combatants expect to be prosecuted by the opposing side merely 
for participating in combat.66 Yet, even if one accepts these 
arguments, it remains difficult to explain why the law should not 
                                                                                                     
original) (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 194 (June 27))). 
 63. See MELZER, supra note 11, at 176 (stating that IHL, like the law-
enforcement paradigm, requires necessity, proportionality, and precaution). 
 64. WALZER, supra note 40, at 39; see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS 
DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY 21–22 
(2008) (“The reason for adopting a rigorous distinction between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello is the need for a bright-line cleavage . . . . Soldiers . . . know 
that, regardless of who started the conflict, certain means of warfare are clearly 
illegal.”). 
 65. See WALZER, supra note 40, at 127–28 (stating that soldiers “are most 
likely to believe that their wars are just,” and that the perspective of all soldiers 
as morally equal allows for rules governing wartime conduct). 
 66. See MCMAHAN, supra note 60, at 191 (“[Soldiers] might reason, for 
example, that if they will be punished in any case if they are defeated, . . . each 
might have nothing to lose . . . from the commission of war crimes or atrocities 
that would increase their chance of victory and thus of immunity to 
punishment.”). 
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impose some duty to resist participation upon combatants who 
know that they are fighting an unjust war.67 
As a historical matter, IHL did not emerge from abstract 
deliberations concerning when killing might be morally 
permissible. The modern jus in bello rules, developed through 
international agreement in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, reflect instead an evolving response to the established 
reality of warfare. For instance, the first international agreement 
to prohibit the use of a weapon of war—the 1868 Saint 
Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight68—speaks of 
the “progress of civilization . . . alleviating as much as possible 
the calamities of war” and of “conciliat[ing] the necessities of war 
with the laws of humanity.”69 The literature on IHL is replete 
with similar indications of a compromised morality, in which the 
interests of humanity must compete against those of military 
necessity.70 
As Jeremy Waldron has written, the development of IHL in 
this way “proceeded on the basis of moral sociology, discerning 
the possibility of a viable norm of restraint in this area,” one “that 
has emerged from centuries of ghastly conflict.”71 That IHL 
relaxes the rule against murder, in other words, does not imbue 
killing in war with a deep moral justification. Instead, IHL 
                                                                                                     
 67. See id. at 6 (arguing that “it is morally wrong to fight in a war that is 
unjust because it lacks a just cause”). The author presents a systematic 
argument rejecting the separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. See 
id. (arguing “against the view that unjust combatants act permissibly when they 
fight within the constraints of the traditional rules of jus in bello”). 
 68. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau 
Recueil (ser. 1) 474, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/130?Open 
Document. 
 69. Id. at 474–75. 
 70. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary to Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 
392–93 (“The law of armed conflict is a compromise based on a balance between 
military necessity, on the one hand, and the requirements of humanity, on the 
other.”); id. at 399 (“Warfare entails a complete upheaval of values.”). 
 71. Jeremy Waldron, Justifying Targeted Killing with a Neutral Principle, 
in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 112, 127 
(Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012). 
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principally seeks to impose at least some “regulative line that can 
be defended (just!) in the midst of an activity that is otherwise 
comprehensively murderous.”72 
This feature of IHL has at least two important implications 
for the debate over targeted killing. First, as Waldron argues, one 
should exercise great caution about expanding IHL’s permissive 
approach to killing.73 In particular, one should avoid the 
automatic assumption that IHL reflects a principled approach to 
killing that is readily susceptible to expansion by analogy.74 That, 
as Waldron argues, is precisely “how a norm against murder 
unravels.”75 This caution is warranted both with respect to 
expanding the IHL rules beyond their present scope and to 
interpreting the requirements of IHL as they apply within the 
acknowledged scope of the law. 
At the same time, the uncertain moral status of IHL also 
makes it difficult to identify absolute limits on when states may 
develop more permissive approaches to killing. In this respect, 
the development of IHL stands as an important precedent for the 
law’s adjusting the norm against murder to accommodate the 
inevitability of certain state practices. Notwithstanding the 
extreme caution that is warranted by this exercise, the very 
existence of IHL also makes it difficult to preclude the 
development of other analogous accommodations. If, for example, 
technological advances facilitate the effective use of targeted 
killing by states to combat terrorist organizations in ways that 
fall outside the traditional boundaries of IHL, it becomes difficult 
to say when precisely the law must hold the line and forbid the 
practice or when, by contrast, the law may once again surrender 
and draw a different line, one that tolerates the general practice 
while seeking, as IHL does, to align it with some basic, more 
minimal, principles of humanity. 
                                                                                                     
 72. Id.  
 73. See id. (“Understanding the background just outlined helps us 
understand the great caution that must be brought to any attempt to change the 
laws of war.”). 
 74. See id. at 128 (arguing that, in this context, the common analogies are 
“all reckless ways to proceed”). 
 75. Id. at 131. 
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It is instructive here to draw a contrast between the issue of 
targeted killing and another debate that has figured prominently 
in recent years, namely, the debate over U.S. interrogation policy 
with respect to detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. 
Those who condemn the waterboarding of detainees, as well as 
other “enhanced interrogation techniques,” may persuasively 
invoke an absolute legal ban on any practices that qualify as 
torture as defined under international law.76 This prohibition 
appears most prominently in the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment,77 an international treaty that has 
received near-universal ratification by states.78 In addition to 
prohibiting both torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, the Convention defines torture as a criminal offense 
subject to extradition obligations79 and specifies that states may 
not torture individuals for purposes of information gathering or 
                                                                                                     
 76. See, e.g., David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of 
Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 61, 79–81 (2005) (describing 
the legal issues surrounding the Justice Department’s interpretation of what 
actions constitute torture). Tellingly, the Administration of President George W. 
Bush did not assert a justification for torture, but instead denied that 
government interrogation practices amounted to torture. See, e.g., Memorandum 
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A at 27 (Aug. 1, 2002) (stating that international 
decisions “have found various aggressive interrogation methods” to not 
constitute torture); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Defends Interrogations, Saying 
Interrogation Methods Aren’t Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at A1 (pointing 
out the controversies regarding the ever-expanding executive authority to 
pursue terror suspects). 
 77. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113. 
 78. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Participants, 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-`9. 
en.pdf (listing the signatories to the Convention and their respective reservations). 
 79. See U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 77, art. 1 (defining torture); id. 
art. 4 (mandating that “acts of torture” be punishable criminal offences); id. art. 
8 (mandating that these acts be “included as extraditable offences”); id. art. 16 
(requiring states to prevent public officials’ “other acts of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined 
in article 1”). 
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any other reason.80 It also states that “[n]o exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of 
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justification of torture.”81 Thus, opponents of 
torture may invoke the Convention as evidence that the 
international community has given the question of torture 
explicit attention and has judged that an absolute ban is 
required, one that allows no derogation. 
The problem of killing, by contrast, is accompanied by no 
such absolute ban. And the ways in which IHL already permits 
killing are dependent on precisely the type of instrumental 
reasoning that international law rejects in the torture context.82 
Again, this is not to say that one should proceed lightly in 
justifying expansive permissions for government-sponsored 
killing. The norm against murder, as Waldron notes, is not just 
any norm, and proposals to further dilute it must be met with 
great skepticism.83 But the structure of IHL also cautions against 
absolute proclamations.84 
In Parts III and IV, we will explore further the possibility of 
justifying some targeted killing outside of both IHL and 
traditional law-enforcement paradigms. In the remainder of this 
Part, we explore reasons why, when IHL does govern a targeted 
                                                                                                     
 80. See id. arts. 1–2 (defining torture and requiring measures to prevent 
torture). 
 81. Id. art. 2, para. 2. The Convention also obligates each state to 
“undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to 
torture.” Id. art. 16, para. 1. The Convention does not explicitly define these 
practices or regulate them with the same detail it employs for torture, but 
neither does the Convention acknowledge any exceptions to this prohibition. See 
id. (prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment without listing any 
exceptions). 
 82. See id. arts. 1–2 (prohibiting torture for any reason, including state of 
war or other public emergencies). 
 83. See Waldron, supra note 71, at 131 (“What is objectionable is the 
inherently abusive character of the attitude [behind] reasoning that says: ‘We 
are allowed to kill some people by principles we already have; surely, by the 
same reasoning, in our present circumstances of insecurity, there must be other 
people we are also allowed to murder.’”). 
 84. See, e.g., U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 77, arts. 1–16 (refusing to 
proscribe killing explicitly and absolutely). 
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killing, this body of law is not as determinative as is often 
supposed.85 
B. IHL and Targeted Killing 
1. The Permission to Kill by Name 
A threshold question is whether a practice of individualized, 
“named” killing is ever compatible with IHL. Some scholars have 
questioned the practice of targeted killing on the grounds that it 
personalizes the conduct of war in a manner incompatible with 
the underlying moral vocabulary of war.86 Michael Gross, for 
example, traces a prohibition on named killing to the seminal 
Lieber Code of 1863,87 which admonishes: 
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual 
belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the 
hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial 
by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows 
such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such 
outrage.88 
As Gross elaborates, the permission to kill in wartime 
presupposes the moral belligerents’ innocence, and both the 
combatants’ permission to kill and their vulnerability to being 
killed derives from their role as impersonal agents of a collective 
entity, the state.89 The problem with targeting individuals on this 
                                                                                                     
 85. See infra notes 86–148 (discussing the application of IHL to targeted 
killing). 
 86. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 17, at 327–29 (questioning the morality of 
targeted killing in wartime); Statman, supra note 17, at 190 (arguing that “the 
problem with targeted killing” is that it undermines “the very justification for 
killing in war,” which is that we ignore an enemy’s personal merits or demerits).  
 87. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), (Apr. 24, 1863) 
[hereinafter Lieber Code], available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110? 
OpenDocument (setting forth a code of conduct for martial law). 
 88. Id. art. 148. 
 89. See Gross, supra note 17, at 326 (“No one is suggesting that soldiers do 
not represent material threats . . . . [A]ny uniformed soldier is vulnerable. . . . 
Soldiers may kill in the service of their state and are therefore innocent of any 
wrongdoing, a sweeping authorization that international law and all nations 
endorse.”). 
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account is that “[o]nce we name soldiers for killing, . . . we upset 
this innocence with precisely the argument that Lieber presents. 
Naming names assigns guilt and, as Lieber suggests, proclaims 
soldiers outlaws. In doing so, named killing places war itself 
beyond convention.”90  
We do not share Gross’s concern about named killing. More 
precisely, we do not believe that it is the practice of naming 
targets itself that triggers Gross’s concern. Indeed, even the 
Lieber Code passage just quoted addresses a concern distinct 
from the practice of named killing per se. The Code focuses on a 
broad class of potential victims, including not only those 
belonging to “the hostile army,” but also those who are merely 
“citizen[s]” or “subject[s],” and thus outside the class of those 
permissibly targetable in war.91 It is, moreover, concerned with 
the proclaiming of individuals as “outlaw[s]” such that they “may 
be slain without trial by any captor.”92 The focus, therefore, is on 
the punitive killing of captured persons. The Code does not 
address whether belligerents may conduct named killings for 
other reasons and in other contexts. 
There are indeed contexts in which named killing may 
operate as a routine battlefield practice without violating the 
moral innocence of targeted combatants. Fernando Tesón 
supplies the helpful example of a soldier who is targeted on the 
battlefield because he is an especially skilled machine gunner, 
who has proven adept at cutting down opposing soldiers seeking 
to advance.93 He maintains, correctly in our view, that it is 
permissible to target the machine gunner as a battlefield 
strategy.94 This sort of individualized targeting of an especially 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id.  
 91. Lieber Code, supra note 87, art. 148. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Fernando R. Tesón, Targeted Killing in War and Peace: A 
Philosophical Analysis, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN 
ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 403, 411 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew 
Altman eds., 2012) (giving the example of soldiers on a battlefield who target a 
particularly effective enemy machine gunner). 
 94. See id. (“He is an unjust enemy combatant and as such may be 
permissibly killed, named or unnamed.”). 
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dangerous opponent reflects a straightforward pursuit of military 
advantage.95  
Suppose now, as Tesón posits, that the opposing army 
happens to have learned the name of its target. Suppose, for 
example, that the belligerents facing the skilled machine gunner 
know that he is the infamous “Private Gunner.”96 The 
permissibility of an order to “take out Private Gunner before he 
cuts down any more of us” does not become illegal, or even 
immoral, merely because the target has now been named. What 
makes this an easy case is that the naming is incidental. 
Although Gunner is individually targeted, he is not targeted in 
his individual capacity. In this case it is wrong to say that 
“[n]aming names assigns guilt and . . . proclaims soldiers 
outlaws.”97 The targeting of Gunner preserves his moral 
innocence; it recognizes the danger that he poses as an especially 
effective combatant. 
As Gross himself recognizes,98 such naming also assumes 
importance in the context of conflicts against terrorist groups who 
do not observe the formalities of war, including the core 
requirements that combatants carry arms openly, have a “fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,” and “conduct[] their 
                                                                                                     
 95. One need not draw on hypothetical examples to justify such targeting. 
Consider the example of World War II German panzer ace Michael Wittmann 
who, at the battle of Villers-Bocage, commanded a tank that destroyed, within a 
space of fifteen minutes, at least eleven Allied tanks, nine half-track vehicles, 
four troop carriers, and two anti-tank guns, singlehandedly prompting Allied 
forces to abandon the recently captured village before a single German 
reinforcement had arrived. See GEORGE FORTY, VILLERS BOCAGE 57–86 (Simon 
Trew ed., 2004) (describing Michael Wittmann’s fighting at Villers-Bocage and 
stating that he personally destroyed “seven cruiser/medium tanks (including one 
Firefly), three Stuart light tanks, one Sherman OP, nine half-tracks, four 
carriers and two anti-tank guns”); DANIEL TAYLOR, VILLERS-BOCAGE: THROUGH 
THE LENS OF THE GERMAN WAR PHOTOGRAPHER 33 (1999) (describing Wittmann’s 
role in the battle and stating that he destroyed “seven gun tanks, one of which 
may have been a Firefly, three Stuarts, one Sherman OP, nine half-tracks, four 
carriers and two anti-tank guns”). To the extent Allied forces were subsequently 
capable of identifying Wittmann on the battlefield, surely they would be 
justified in taking special effort to destroy his tank. 
 96. In Tesón’s original hypothetical, he is named “Colonel Sanders.” Tesón, 
supra note 93, at 411. 
 97. Gross, supra note 17, at 326. 
 98. See id. at 329 (assessing the appropriateness of named killing against 
terrorists).  
BEYOND WAR 1399 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”99 
Those who fail to qualify as privileged combatants may 
nevertheless be attacked “for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities.”100 The reach of this provision is currently a matter 
of controversy.101 A civilian targeted in the act of firing a machine 
gun on the battlefield is an easy case, and the legal advisor to 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has further 
opined that civilians who have assumed a “continuous combat 
function” may be treated as regular members of organized armed 
groups.102 
More divisive is how to apply IHL to terrorism suspects who 
may spend months or even years planning attacks in hiding.103 
Assuming we do treat such persons as belligerents, a practice of 
named killing may in fact be essential because, as Gross 
observes, there are no means to identify such persons as 
belligerents absent individualized assessment.104 Accepting this 
logic does not, however, require us to adopt a special terrorism-
based exception to a prohibition against named killing, as Gross 
would seem to suggest.105 Instead, it merely reinforces the 
broader point that there is no inherent tension between the 
                                                                                                     
 99. POW Convention, supra note 48, art. 4(A)(2). 
 100. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 51(3). 
 101. See Gross, supra note 17, at 326 (noting the lack of consensus “about 
the status of those who belong to an organization that does not meet the 
minimal standards set by [Additional] Protocol I”). 
 102. See Legal Adviser to the Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law, 31–36 (May 2009) (by Nils Melzer) 
[hereinafter ICRC Guidance], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files 
/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (distinguishing between civilians and members of 
organized armed groups). 
 103. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED 
KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 60, 63 (Claire 
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (discussing the 
threats terrorists pose, individually and collectively, and arguing for a 
membership-based approach to identifying belligerents). 
 104. See Gross, supra note 17, at 330 (discussing the problem of identifying 
as combatants “guerrillas, militants, terrorists and others without uniforms” 
and stating that naming can be useful or even necessary in such cases). 
 105. See id. at 331 (“Perhaps targeted killings are an appropriate response 
to terrorism precisely because terrorists deserve to suffer harm in a way that 
just combatants do not.”). 
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concept of named killing itself and the paradigm of international 
humanitarian law. 
2. Targeted Killing in a Global Battlefield 
None of this is to say, however, that there is nothing in the 
practice of naming targets that challenges the structure of IHL. 
Returning to Tesón’s machine-gunner example, suppose that 
military officials deem Gunner so dangerous that, so long as the 
war continues and he remains in military service, he is to be 
tracked and killed wherever he may be found. Intelligence 
officials trace Gunner to an island resort where he is enjoying an 
extended vacation with his family. A special commando unit is 
dispatched to kill him with instructions to follow the usual war 
rules of engagement. The commandos locate Gunner and shoot 
him while he is sunbathing on the beach. We suspect that many 
readers will be more troubled by this scenario than by our 
previous hypothetical, although it can be difficult to explain why. 
a. The Feasibility of Capture 
One troubling aspect of this hypothetical scenario is that the 
commandos have elected to neutralize Gunner’s machine-gun 
skills by killing him instead of capturing him and holding him as 
a prisoner of war until the termination of hostilities. Note that 
under Koh’s justification of bin Laden’s killing, this aspect of the 
operation is permissible so long as Gunner has not clearly 
communicated his surrender.106 If we embrace Koh’s statement as 
reflecting an inflexible rule applying to all belligerents in war, 
then it makes no difference to the law that Gunner poses no risk 
at all to the commandos, or that capture would be easy under the 
circumstances.107 
                                                                                                     
 106. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (describing Koh’s 
justification of the bin Laden killing). 
 107. Note that U.S. government officials have indicated that the feasibility 
of capture may be a factor in the lawfulness of a targeted killing when the 
killing is directed against a U.S. citizen, as was the case with Anwar al-Aulaqi. 
See Holder, supra note 16 (stating that targeted killing of a U.S. citizen terrorist 
is lawful at least when there is an imminent threat of violent attack, “capture is 
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This, however, cannot be an accurate statement of the jus in 
bello rules, at least not if they are to be interpreted and applied in 
a way that is consistent with a plausible account of morality. The 
question of whether and when international law imposes a duty 
to capture rather than kill lawful targets of war has provoked 
debate in recent years. The Supreme Court of Israel’s 2005 ruling 
on Israel’s targeted killing policy stated that “a civilian taking a 
direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is 
doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed,”108 and the 
ICRC’s subsequent non-binding guidance on the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities argued more broadly that “it would 
defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain 
from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender where there 
manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.”109 But these 
pronouncements have not attracted widespread acceptance; the 
ICRC’s conclusion, in particular, faced significant resistance from 
many of the experts whom the ICRC had invited to participate in 
its study.110 
The doctrinal argument favoring attempted capture in these 
circumstances appeals to a requirement of military necessity, the 
idea that the law permits “only that degree and kind of force, not 
otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required 
in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely 
                                                                                                     
not feasible,” and the operation would be conducted according to law of war 
principles). This distinction between citizens and non-citizens does not derive 
from IHL, and official statements regarding the killing of bin Laden and other 
foreign terrorists have not included the general feasibility of capture as a legally 
relevant factor, except in the narrowly defined circumstances Koh identified, 
which require “a genuine offer of surrender that is clearly communicated” and 
that may be safely received. Koh, supra note 14. 
 108. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel 
¶ 40 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/ 
a34/02007690.a34.pdf. 
 109. ICRC Guidance, supra note 102, at 82. 
 110. See id. at 82 n.221 (“During the expert meetings, it was generally 
recognized that the approach [to choose capture over killing] is unlikely to be 
operable in classic battlefield situations . . . and that armed forces . . . may not 
always have the means or opportunity to capture rather than kill.”); W. Hays 
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No 
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 
799–801 (2010) (summarizing experts’ objections to Part IX of the ICRC 
Guidance). 
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the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest 
possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and 
resources.”111 The problem with this appeal is that IHL has 
traditionally declined to translate the necessity principle into 
rules that protect the lives of combatants themselves.112 
This asymmetry finds expression in the Civil-War era Lieber 
Code, which provides that “[m]ilitary necessity admits of all 
direct destruction of life or limb of ‘armed’ enemies.”113 A similar 
selectivity appears in the requirements of Additional Protocol I, 
which gives effect to the restraint of military necessity. The 
employment of “weapons, projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering” is forbidden.114 Objects are not proper military targets 
unless their destruction “offers a definite military advantage.”115 
Attacks on military targets are forbidden if expected to result in 
incidental loss to civilians or civilian objects that is excessive 
compared to the “concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”116 Yet no parallel provision imposes a necessity-
based limitation on the use of lethal force against combatants 
themselves.117 
How does one reconcile this omission with the general 
principle that necessity justifies the permissive rules of IHL? The 
most plausible explanation appeals to military necessity itself. 
                                                                                                     
 111. ICRC Guidance, supra note 102, at 79 (quoting United Kingdom 
Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, ¶ 2.2). This 
language closely mirrors that set forth in the Lieber Code. See Lieber Code, 
supra note 87, art. 14 (“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized 
nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for 
securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law 
and usages of war.”).  
 112. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (pointing out the inconsistent 
application of the necessity principle). 
 113. Lieber Code, supra note 87, art. 15. Only with respect to “other 
persons” does the Code require that destruction be “incidentally ‘unavoidable.’” 
Id. 
 114. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art 35. 
 115. Id. art. 52(2). 
 116. Id. art. 51(5)(b). 
 117. See Parks, supra note 110, at 804 (“There is no ‘military necessity’ 
determination requirement for an individual soldier to engage an enemy 
combatant or a civilian determined to be taking a direct part in hostilities, any 
more than there is for a soldier to attack an enemy tank.”). 
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The law generally permits the killing of all enemy combatants, 
without imposing any obligation to assess the military value of 
individual targets or to consider less lethal means, because the 
modalities of war generally do not permit those pursuing military 
advantage to make such individualized assessments. The nature 
of armed conflict through history has been to pursue victory 
precisely through the destruction of the opposing forces. In the 
context of the traditional battlefield, belligerents are generally 
justified in treating all opposing forces as sources of danger and 
as targets whose destruction has military advantage. A rule to 
the contrary, one that requires combatants to make 
individualized threat assessments for each targeted enemy, 
would burden the waging of war in ways not acceptable to states, 
including by exposing combatants to increased risk.118 On this 
                                                                                                     
 118. Such practical considerations inform W. Hays Parks’s opposition to 
Part IX of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law. See Parks, 
supra note 110, at 809–10 (arguing against a necessity-based limit on the use of 
lethal force against combatants). Parks reasoned:  
[O]ther than the law of war prohibitions on perfidy and denial of 
quarter, governments and courts have seen the prudence in declining 
to draw such a line owing to the many vagaries that exist not only in 
domestic law enforcement situations but also, and in particular, on 
the battlefield. This is the case in combat in recognition of the 
obligation imposed by many nations on their military forces not to 
surrender and, indeed, to resist surrender either by force or through 
escape and evasion.  
Id. On this point, Parks is especially concerned by the prospect that the ICRC 
Guidance would require individual soldiers to apply a “use-of-force continuum.” 
See id. at 796 (arguing that the ICRC Guidance wrongly “resurrects and offers 
Pictet’s unaccepted use-of-force continuum theory as if it were an internationally 
accepted, binding legal formula”). Pictet’s theory is best summarized by his 
statement that  
[i]f we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not 
wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we 
must not kill him. If there are two means to achieve the same 
military advantage, we must choose the one which causes the lesser 
evil. 
JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 75–76 (1985). The ICRC Guidance, however, interprets this statement to 
support the more basic point that “it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill 
an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender 
where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.” ICRC 
Guidance, supra note 102, at 82. The ICRC Guidance also acknowledges that 
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account, the general rule permitting the targeting of all 
combatants who are not hors de combat is not so much a violation 
of the necessity principle as an expression of it.  
This account loses all plausibility, however, when we imagine 
circumstances, such as the killing of Gunner on vacation, that 
bear no resemblance to the battlefield modalities that have 
historically animated IHL, and that present no functional reason 
why a more permissive rule to killing should prevail. When 
Gunner is found isolated from active combat or other military 
presence and is defenseless in a bathing suit, there is no account 
of military necessity with which one can make sense of a rule that 
permits killing short of surrender, or indeed of any rule that 
would be more tolerant of killing than that applicable to law-
enforcement officials seeking to apprehend Gunner under like 
circumstances.  
One could argue that Gunner’s utter defenselessness has 
already placed him “in the power of an adverse Party” and thus 
rendered him hors de combat.119 The ICRC Commentary to 
Additional Protocol I supports this view.120 If that is correct, then 
the permission to kill Gunner under IHL is already weaker than 
suggested by Koh’s account of IHL in the context of the bin Laden 
killing. More broadly, however, a rule permitting the killing of 
Gunner under these circumstances runs up against a deep 
structural constraint that is foundational to IHL: the idea that 
IHL’s expanded permission to kill is, at some level, linked to and 
                                                                                                     
Pictet’s proposed approach “is unlikely to be operable in classic battlefield 
situations involving large-scale confrontations and that armed forces operating 
in situations of armed conflict, even if equipped with sophisticated weaponry and 
means of observation, may not always have the means or the opportunity to 
capture rather than kill.” Id. at 82 n.221 (citations omitted). 
 119. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art 41. 
 120. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 70, at 484 (maintaining 
that Protocol I reflected the determination of states to embrace the protections 
of hors de combat status in cases in which land forces “have the adversary at 
their mercy by means of overwhelmingly superior firing power to the point 
where they can force the adversary to cease combat”). This claim has support in 
the change from the Third Geneva Convention’s reference to those who have 
“‘fallen into the power’ of the enemy” to Protocol I’s parallel reference, “in the 
power of an adverse Party.” Id. “A defenceless adversary,” the Commentary 
continues, “is ‘hors de combat’ whether or not he has laid down arms.” Id.  
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justified by considerations of military necessity.121 The problem is 
not merely that Gunner’s specific killing lacks military necessity 
given the feasibility of capture but also that a general rule 
permitting him to be killed under these circumstances is itself 
irreconcilable with an account of military necessity, or indeed 
with the pursuit of any military advantage.122  
Accordingly, to identify a capture duty in these 
circumstances does not, as W. Hays Parks has feared, implement 
a fundamental alteration in IHL by requiring individual soldiers 
to always consider the feasibility of capture before deploying 
lethal force.123 Instead, our conclusion rests on the more modest 
insight that IHL’s generally broad permission to kill reflects some 
basic assumptions about battlefield modalities. When IHL travels 
to contexts that, as a functional matter, fail the most expansive 
definition of a battlefield, the overarching requirement of 
necessity must be appraised anew. 
Some scholars have reached a similar conclusion on the 
ground that targeted killing occupies a hybrid position between 
the IHL paradigm and the law-enforcement paradigm. This, for 
instance, is how Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann understand 
the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling that IHL properly applied to 
Israel’s policy of targeted killings, but that the legality of those 
killings hinged on the absence of a reasonable alternative for 
capturing the targeted terrorists.124 Or, as Nils Melzer would see 
it, the case we have just presented supports the view that 
necessity itself must dictate whether the legal paradigm is IHL or 
law-enforcement.125 In other words, the law-enforcement 
                                                                                                     
 121. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the importance 
of military necessity in state-sanctioned killing). 
 122. Given the lack of necessity, moreover, any resultant risk to civilians 
posed by employing lethal force against Gunner would necessarily be 
impermissible under the proportionality test. See Additional Protocol I, supra 
note 39, art. 51(5)(b) (protecting civilians from harm that “would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”). 
 123. See supra note 118 (discussing Parks’s concern). 
 124. See Blum & Heymann, supra note 17, at 158 (arguing that “the court’s 
requirement to try to apprehend the terrorist is far more easily situated within 
a law-enforcement model of regular policing operations and signifies the 
uneasiness that the court felt about the war paradigm”). 
 125. See ICRC Guidance, supra note 102, at 82 (“[I]t would defy the basic 
notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an 
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paradigm applies to the Gunner killing because there is no 
necessity supporting the invocation of the IHL paradigm. 
Whether we phrase the argument that way or not is largely a 
matter of semantics in this instance, however, because we arrive 
at the same conclusion under the IHL paradigm itself. Indeed, in 
our example, Gunner is a lawful combatant participating in a 
traditional armed conflict, and we have made no assumptions 
that his targeting is informed by law-enforcement considerations 
of any sort. Either paradigm yields the same result under the 
facts presented. 
Critically, the difficulties we have just described are not a 
direct consequence of named targeting per se. It is not the act of 
naming Gunner for killing that complicates the decision to kill 
rather than capture. At the same time, this problem is one that is 
distinctly associated with a practice of individualized targeting. 
The impulse to follow Gunner across the world is one that derives 
from assigning unique danger to him as an individual, rather 
than as an anonymous and substitutable member of the broader 
collective force that remains engaged on the battlefield. And it is 
this impulse that puts pressure on IHL by asking us how its 
requirements apply under nonparadigmatic conditions that do 
not resemble those of a conventional battlefield. 
b. The Harm of a Diffuse Battlefield 
Killing Gunner on vacation also raises other problems that 
are distinct from the question of capture. We may bring these into 
focus by assuming that capturing Gunner is infeasible. Perhaps 
there is only a short window of time to neutralize him before he 
becomes untraceable, and the only feasible option is a missile 
strike. The operation now entails killing Gunner and unavoidable 
risk to the civilians in Gunner’s proximity. 
This version of the hypothetical more directly raises the issue 
of proportionality: is the risk to civilians justifiable in light of the 
military advantage to be gained by killing Gunner?126 But the 
                                                                                                     
opportunity to surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of 
lethal force.”). 
 126. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 51(5)(b). 
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problem is also broader than the direct risk to specific civilians. 
There is something unsettling in the spread of war tactics beyond 
the conventional battlefield, in the idea that war may follow 
individual belligerents wherever they go. It is disturbing in 
particular to reflect on the fate of the persons and property in the 
area surrounding Gunner, that may now be victimized by jus in 
bello rules that treat them as potential collateral damage whose 
incidental destruction may be weighed against the utility of 
targeting Gunner. This fear that war may strike anywhere at any 
time has figured prominently in recent debates over U.S. 
targeted-killing policy. Critics have asked whether, with the 
inevitable spread of technology, we are willing to commit to a 
reading of the law that would allow, for example, Iran to launch 
missile strikes on U.S. cities against discrete individuals whom it 
considers to be enemy combatants.127 
Typically, this problem is treated as one of jus ad bellum. 
International law takes account of the dangers of spreading war 
by limiting the conditions under which states may permissibly 
resort to armed force,128 and the targeting of Gunner may 
constitute an act of aggression against the state where he is 
vacationing. The conditions under which a state may resort to 
armed force on the territory of a neutral third state is currently a 
matter of debate,129 but that debate is not the end of the matter. 
The jus ad bellum issue may be overcome: perhaps Gunner is 
vacationing in a state that has given its consent to the raid,130 or 
that is already party to the conflict. We will further assume, for 
                                                                                                     
 127. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE VIOLENCE OF PEACE: AMERICA’S WARS 
IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 60–61 (2010) (acknowledging that a similar strike against 
the United States would be justified if our targeted killings are justified against 
those we deem terrorists).  
 128. See supra II.A (discussing IHL’s limits on use of force). 
 129. See supra note 54 (providing several scholars’ discussions about 
targeting terrorist suspects on third-party territory). 
 130. Indeed, in many cases of targeted killing, including in northwest 
Pakistan and in Yemen, the United States has benefitted from persuasive 
claims to state consent. See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 267 (noting that 
targeting killing operations in northwest Pakistan “likely enjoy at least some 
tacit diplomatic acquiescence, even though Pakistani officials occasionally 
publicly criticize them for domestic political consumption”); id. at 266 (observing 
that the operation against Anwar al-Aulaqi “appears to have had the benefit of 
Yemen’s consent and perhaps its involvement”). 
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purposes of this discussion, that IHL applies away from the 
traditional battlefield and follows Gunner to his vacation spot.131  
There is some debate in the literature concerning whether a 
combatant is ever targetable when located away from the 
battlefield.132 Yet even assuming that IHL governs this scenario, 
the attack remains troubling pursuant to IHL’s requirement of 
proportionality. In real life, even an ace machine gunner like 
Gunner is unlikely to be perceived, simply on account of his 
combat skills, as sufficiently dangerous to justify the type of 
dedicated operation we have imagined. We may therefore also 
question whether it is permissible, consistent with the demands 
of proportionality, to risk civilian lives in this way merely to 
neutralize a single combat soldier.  
Arguments of this nature are complicated by the 
indeterminacy of the legal standard. To compare—as the 
proportionality formula requires—the “concrete and direct 
military advantage” against the expected “incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof”133 requires the weighing of 
incommensurables.134 The law also fails to specify the extent to 
which combatants must put their own forces at risk in order to 
reduce risks to civilians.135 As a consequence, application of the 
                                                                                                     
 131. On problems associated with the geography of IHL, see Laurie R. 
Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism, 
39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2–6 (2010). 
 132. Compare Tesón, supra note 93, at 412–15 (arguing that a combatant on 
vacation is an impermissible target), with Statman, supra note 17, at 196 
(rejecting the distinction between a combatant in military headquarters and a 
combatant on vacation). 
 133. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 51(5)(b). 
 134. See Final Rep. to the Prosecutor by the Comm. Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 48 
(June 13, 2000), available at www.icty.org/sid/10052 (“Unfortunately, most 
applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so clear cut. It is 
much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms . . . . 
One cannot easily assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to 
capturing a particular military objective.”). 
 135. Additional Protocol I requires combatants to take “all feasible 
precautions” to avoid loss of civilian life but does not specify what is meant by 
“feasible.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). On the problem 
of force protection versus enemy civilian protection, see David J. Luban, Risk 
Taking and Force Protection 38 (Georgetown Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 11-
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proportionality formula inevitably extends great deference to 
military judgment. 
Does this already-difficult calculus necessarily change 
because Gunner is on vacation? We think it does. Although it is 
impossible to demark the precise point at which claims of 
military advantage fail to outweigh incidental risk to civilians, we 
believe that many will intuitively and justifiably conclude that 
any version of our Gunner-on-vacation hypothetical involving risk 
to civilians presents a case in which an attack on a military 
target cannot be justified in light of the danger posed to civilians. 
With respect to the military advantage side of the equation, 
one difference between the battlefield and vacation settings is 
that the killing of Gunner on the battlefield more readily 
contributes to an immediate, more general military goal. If, for 
example, Gunner is killed during a battle to seize a strategic 
village, advance the front line, or defend a position, then the 
value of his individual death is subsumed by the military 
advantage associated with that broader objective. Even though he 
is targeted individually, the targeting occurs in the context of an 
operation that necessitates the killing of enemy combatants, and, 
in that broader context, there are sound reasons to give special 
attention to the threat posed by Gunner. When Gunner is 
specifically targeted on vacation, by contrast, one is forced to 
focus on him in isolation and ask how much military advantage is 
anticipated from the neutralization of Gunner alone, outside of 
any immediate battlefield context. It is true that Gunner is now 
unable to return to the battlefield and thus is prevented from 
making future military contributions. But this causal link is more 
speculative and attenuated, and it is harder to demonstrate why 
Gunner merits such individualized attention. 
The dangers to civilians likewise require more focused 
attention. When a rocket attack on the vacationing Gunner kills 
bystanders, it is clear that the lives lost are casualties of the 
attack on Gunner alone. Individual incidents on the battlefield 
may also have this but-for quality, but there is also a generalized 
risk that exists in areas of continuous combat. Consider the 
Allied advance in Normandy during World War II, which, by 
                                                                                                     
72, 2011), in READING WALZER (Itzhak Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds., 
forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1855263. 
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some estimates, claimed close to 20,000 French civilian lives.136 
At a broad level of generality, one can say that these large-scale 
civilian deaths were a tragic, but predictable, feature of the 
campaign to liberate France. Although that broad point did not 
relieve individual combatants of a duty to protect civilian life in 
particular engagements, it was easier to justify incidental civilian 
losses in the context of a broader campaign that necessarily 
imposed a generalized risk on all of Normandy’s residents. When 
Gunner is targeted on vacation, by contrast, it becomes clearer 
that the attack has put a class of civilians in danger, a class that 
faced no special risks otherwise. The risk to civilians, in other 
words, is a risk associated most directly with the decision to 
target Gunner. This feature of the attack only serves to exert 
further pressure on the planners of the attack to justify the 
special attention owed to Gunner. 
One may, in addition, identify harm to Gunner himself. 
Although Gunner is targetable as a combatant in the theater of 
war, his liability to be killed derives not from personal 
culpability, but from his commitment—voluntary or not—to 
render himself liable through service as a combatant fighting for 
a broader collective. Although the point is arguable, one can 
reasonably maintain that there is a limit to this commitment, and 
that Gunner has a justified expectation that his liability to be 
killed in battle does not entail a liability to be singled out and 
chased across the world in this manner. 
For reasons already addressed, it is impossible to demark the 
precise point at which claims of military advantage fail to 
outweigh incidental risk to civilians, but we believe that many 
will intuitively conclude that our Gunner-on-vacation 
hypothetical presents a case in which an attack on a military 
target cannot be justified if the attack poses any danger to 
civilians. These considerations all urge special caution with 
respect to targeted-killing operations that invoke the permissive 
IHL rules in contexts outside the traditional battlefield. 
We do not argue, however, that IHL can or should be 
interpreted to impose a blanket ban on targeted killings. Our 
                                                                                                     
 136. See ANTONY BEEVOR, D-DAY: THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY 519 (2009) 
(stating that 19,890 French civilians were killed during the liberation of 
Normandy). 
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hypothetical case of Gunner on vacation is admittedly far-fetched, 
and the cases of targeted killing that have provoked controversy 
in recent years have benefited from more compelling appeals to 
necessity than what we have imagined here. Our point, rather, is 
that when targeted killing moves away from the traditional 
battlefield, its permissibility will generally require special 
justification in at least two interrelated ways, both of which flow 
naturally from the application of IHL and do not borrow from the 
law-enforcement paradigm. 
First, the targeted killing of an individual in these 
circumstances generally cannot be justified merely by the target’s 
status as a combatant. The targeting instead requires special 
justification regarding the threat that the individual poses, either 
in isolation or in combination with others who are similarly 
targeted.137 For example, such a justification may present itself 
when the target poses an imminent or especially high threat; the 
target wields significant authority within an enemy organization; 
or there is sound reason to believe that a policy of targeting like-
situated persons will, in the aggregate, prove sufficiently feasible 
to have a significant military advantage. Second, when military 
operations target isolated individuals, the acceptable risk of 
civilian casualties must generally be lower than in more 
conventional military operations. 
These considerations are especially salient to the difficult 
interpretive question of how to determine which nontraditional 
combatants may be targeted, pursuant to IHL, as civilians 
directly participating in hostilities.138 For example, even if one 
maintains (as we do not) that this category should be read 
broadly to encompass all members of terrorist organizations 
engaged in hostilities,139 that interpretation will be unlikely to 
satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality in 
concrete cases of targeted killing. Civilian lives should not be 
risked, for example, in order to kill a member of al Qaeda whose 
                                                                                                     
 137. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (describing 
circumstances in which an individual may be targeted because of the especially 
dangerous threat that he poses). 
 138. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (stating that civilians 
may be targeted if they participate in hostilities). 
 139. See, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 103, at 84–85 (suggesting that all members 
of terrorist organizations might be engaged in continuous combat function). 
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contribution to the group is known to consist only of cooking 
meals or sweeping floors.140 This remains the case whether or not 
one labels the target a combatant under IHL. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in reducing these 
intuitions to concrete operational guidance, evolving U.S. policies 
affirm the special sensitivities that accompany targeted killing as 
a strategy of war. Gregory McNeal has documented that U.S. 
policy for preplanned aerial drone strikes in Afghanistan have 
generally required a collateral damage estimation process that is 
intended to ensure that there will be a less than 10% probability 
of serious or lethal wounds to non-combatants.141 He reports that 
“less than [1%] of pre-planned operations that followed the 
collateral damage estimation process resulted in collateral 
damage.”142 Moreover, when even one civilian casualty is 
expected, the President of the United States or the Secretary of 
Defense must personally approve the strike.143 Even considering 
that official U.S. casualty claims reportedly rely on a contested 
criterion that generally “counts all military-age males in a strike 
zone as combatants,”144 these policies reflect a concern for 
limiting incidental civilian casualties that goes far beyond the 
indeterminate guidance provided by Additional Protocol I. 
                                                                                                     
 140. The more difficult cases concern financiers and others who occupy 
significant positions in the group but whose functions are not obviously 
analogous to traditional combat functions. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. 
Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel ¶ 35 [2005] (Isr.), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (noting 
that “a person who aids the unlawful combatants by general strategic analysis, 
and grants them logistical, general support, including monetary aid” does not 
directly participate in hostilities, but that there “is a debate surrounding the 
following case: a person driving a truck carrying ammunition”). 
 141.  Gregory S. McNeal, Are Targeted Killings Unlawful? A Case Study in 
Empirical Claims Without Empirical Evidence, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND 
MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 326, 328 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David 
Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012). 
 142. Id. at 331. 
 143. Id. According to a recent New York Times article, the President’s 
involvement is even greater than mandated by this policy. See Becker & Shane, 
supra note 23 (“[N]ominations go to the White House, where by his own 
insistence and guided by Mr. Brennan, Mr. Obama must approve any name. He 
signs off on every strike in Yemen and Somalia and also on the more complex 
and risky strikes in Pakistan—about a third of the total.”). 
 144. Becker & Shane, supra note 23. 
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3. The Problem of Guilt 
Our final twist on the Gunner scenario deals with questions 
of culpability and mixed motives. Suppose that the officer who 
orders Gunner’s killing on the battlefield is motivated by reasons 
other than Gunner’s machine-gun skills. It turns out that Gunner 
is a villain who, before the war, murdered the officer’s family. The 
officer therefore invokes the rules of war opportunistically, as a 
cloak to disguise what is in fact a desire to exact revenge. 
One might argue that Gunner, as a combatant in armed 
conflict, remains liable to be killed under the IHL rules, and thus 
has no right to complain of his killing. So long as hostilities 
persist, opposing combatants may kill Gunner at any time. From 
one perspective, that the officer has a grudge against Gunner 
should not matter any more than that the officer might be 
fighting only for reasons of financial self-interest rather than 
patriotism. The individual motives of combatants have, at best, 
limited relevance when combatants act in conformity with the 
broader policy of the state or collective entity they serve. And 
here it is the state’s policy that combatants such as Gunner 
should be attacked even when they are not villains. 
Nonetheless, we suspect that most readers will agree that 
the targeting of Gunner under the circumstances described is 
unsustainable under the IHL paradigm. The problem with killing 
Gunner on account of his past crimes is that his targeting is not 
informed in any way by military considerations. Thus, the 
problem is similar to the one presented by our Gunner-on-the-
beach hypothetical. This culpability-driven targeting is precisely 
the sort of killing that justifiably triggers Gross’s objection, which 
he associates more broadly (and incorrectly in our view) with the 
very concept of targeted killing.145 Here, the killing assigns guilt 
to Gunner in his individual capacity, thereby abusing the 
permission to kill that derives solely from Gunner’s impersonal 
status as an agent of the state.146 
                                                                                                     
 145. See Gross supra note 17, at 328 (suggesting that targeted killings based 
on an assumption of guilt place these killings outside the scope of just-war 
conventions that allow killing combatants without due process of the law). 
 146. We do not attempt here to resolve more difficult permutations of our 
hypothetical in which the officer’s motives are mixed. For example, suppose 
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In Parts III and IV, we explore the possibility that individual 
culpability may, in special circumstances, factor into 
justifications for targeted killing that do not draw from the IHL 
paradigm.147 Note, however, that even within the structure of 
IHL, individual guilt may inform targeting decisions, provided it 
does so for reasons that speak to considerations of military 
necessity.148 If we suppose that Gunner is a notorious war 
criminal, his targeting serves to prevent further abuses against 
civilians and enemy combatants. Similarly, if Gunner is deeply 
involved in the perpetration of an ongoing genocide, whose 
prevention is the very cause of war, then targeting Gunner on 
culpability-based criteria serves a preventive function that 
directly advances the jus ad bellum. The critical distinction in 
both cases, however, is that the targeting remains rooted in 
preventive, rather than punitive, considerations. 
The question of improper or mixed motives has obvious 
salience to the context of terrorism, in which government officials 
invoke IHL to justify the targeted killing of alleged combatants 
who are simultaneously accused of serious crimes. It is partly on 
account of this duality that the practice of targeted killing has 
elicited so much controversy over whether IHL or law 
enforcement is the correct legal paradigm. Our hypothetical 
brings to light a limitation of the IHL paradigm that receives no 
explicit attention in the law and is often overlooked in this 
debate: an attack that is objectively justifiable under IHL may 
nevertheless be impermissible because it is pursued for the wrong 
reasons. At the same time, this limitation is complicated by the 
                                                                                                     
pressing military considerations dictate that a machine gun be destroyed at 
some point during a particular twenty-four-hour period. The machine gun is 
continuously manned in shifts so that destroying the gun will also entail killing 
a machine gunner, and personal grudges lead the gun to be destroyed during the 
precise moment when Gunner is manning it. This example is more difficult 
because we may assume that the officer would never have ordered Gunner’s 
killing absent pressing military necessity. Nevertheless, improper motives 
resolved the arbitrary question of precisely when to attack the machine gun. 
 147. See infra Parts III–IV (discussing the scope of permissible killing in 
peacetime and discussing possible revisions to contemporary theory). 
 148. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 17, at 327 (addressing the difficulties of 
placing targeted killings within the framework of either the IHL or law 
enforcement). 
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ambiguity that culpability-based targeting is sometimes justified 
by the logic of IHL when rooted in preventive rather than 
retributive considerations. 
C. The War Paradigm and the bin Laden Killing 
Although the hypothetical scenarios we have outlined do not 
focus on terror cases, they highlight many of the issues that have 
provoked controversy over targeted killing in recent years, 
whether in the context of U.S. drone strikes in northwest 
Pakistan and Yemen or the more recent raid on bin Laden’s 
compound in Abbottabad. These cases demonstrate a trend 
toward targeted killing away from the conventional battlefield of 
named individuals who, in many cases, are also wanted for 
serious crimes. 
The bin Laden killing is, in some respects, an easier case 
than it might have been. In authorizing the operation, President 
Obama reportedly rejected Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s 
recommendation to deploy a missile strike to obliterate the 
suburban compound.149 Although doing so would have minimized 
the risks to U.S. military personnel, the President was reportedly 
uncomfortable with the risk to civilian lives and property that 
would have resulted from deploying bombs of the required 
intensity into the suburban area.150 Reports have also noted 
uncertainty regarding whether bin Laden was, in fact, residing in 
the compound, pointing out that a missile strike would not have 
allowed the same positive identification of the target in the way 
the Navy SEALs’ raid on the compound did.151 
These considerations supply powerful moral and political 
support to the President’s choice. Whether they reveal a legal 
obligation to privilege a special-forces raid over less discriminate 
                                                                                                     
 149. See Schmidle, supra note 4, at 38 (providing a detailed narrative of the 
planning of and raid on Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound). 
 150. See id. (noting that the amount of explosives necessary to penetrate bin 
Laden’s compound would have created “the equivalent of an earthquake” and 
“[t]he prospect of flattening a Pakistani city made [President] Obama pause”).  
 151. See id. at 40 (reporting that the confidence among CIA analysts that 
bin Laden was in the compound ranged from forty percent to ninety-five 
percent). 
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means under the circumstances raises a more difficult question 
about the limits of IHL. Unlike our hypothetical machine gunner, 
Osama bin Laden was a leadership figure of central importance, 
whose targeting was a priority of U.S. military efforts for the last 
decade.152 Although we have argued that cases of targeted killing 
will frequently justify a stricter application of the proportionality 
test, the possibility of incidental civilian losses in the pursuit of 
important military objectives remains a core feature of IHL’s 
permissive approach to killing.153 The general requirement to 
discriminate between military and civilian objects, moreover, has 
resisted the development of determinate standards dictating how 
much personal risk combatants must assume in order to 
minimize risk to civilians.154 Although we are inclined to agree 
with those who argue that military planners should not assign 
greater value to their own combatants’ lives than to those of 
civilians, this is not an issue that is firmly resolved by existing 
legal standards.155  
It is tempting to argue that if the U.S. military would have 
been justified in conducting a missile attack on the bin Laden 
compound, then any less destructive method of killing the al 
Qaeda leader would have also been permissible. We should be 
glad, as some have argued, that the military did not simply 
obliterate the Abbottabad compound but instead subjected U.S. 
servicemen to substantial risk to protect civilian lives.156 We 
should therefore avoid imposing additional legal requirements 
that might deter similar humanitarian gestures. There is some 
merit to this argument, but this line of thinking only goes so far.  
                                                                                                     
 152. See id. at 36 (stating that, after several previous failed attempts, the 
Abbottabad raid was the team’s “first serious attempt since late 2001 at killing 
[bin Laden]”). 
 153. See supra notes 126–33 and accompanying text (discussing the 
proportionality requirement with respect to risk to civilians). 
 154. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (pointing out vagueness in 
the proportionality requirement). 
 155. See Luban, supra note 135, at 12 (discussing the viability of the idea 
that “soldiers must place higher value on their own civilians than on 
themselves, but higher value on themselves than on enemy civilians”). 
 156. See Schmidle, supra note 4, at 38 (noting that an airstrike would have 
avoided the risk of “having American boots on the ground in Pakistan” and 
lessened the risk to American soldiers). 
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It is one thing to employ a means of attack, such as a remote 
missile strike, which, if permissible, permits neither perfect 
discrimination between combatants and civilians nor capture in 
lieu of killing. But the justification for employing such means, if 
legitimate, must be rooted in considerations of military 
advantage, including some degree of force protection, and not in a 
simple desire to kill rather than capture. The decision to 
neutralize bin Laden by means of a raid complicates the picture 
because, by electing to undertake a more discriminating and 
risky operation, the military opened up the possibility of capture 
in lieu of killing. The challenge, then, is to explain why the 
commandos should remain free of any duty whatsoever to capture 
short of bin Laden’s affirmative surrender.  
This challenge is particularly acute in this case because the 
mechanics of the operation—a raid on a residential compound in 
an (at least nominally) allied state, and in an area that was not 
otherwise the site of ongoing hostilities or of a hostile military 
presence—resemble peacetime law enforcement so closely that it 
is difficult to explain why considerations of military necessity 
impose functional requirements distinct from those we associate 
with law enforcement. 
This is not to argue that the operation was illegal. Clearly, 
the Navy SEALs who raided the Abbottabad compound faced 
great risks in pursuing bin Laden, a fact that distinguishes their 
situation from our hypothetical combatants who pursue Gunner 
on vacation. As we discuss below, it is quite possible, depending 
on the facts, that the use of lethal force was justified even if we 
assume that traditional law-enforcement principles applied.157 
We do not possess sufficient knowledge of the rules of 
engagement or the facts on the ground to answer this question, 
but surely even law-enforcement officials undertaking a 
dangerous raid on a notorious terrorist’s well-guarded residential 
compound will generally be justified in acting under the 
assumption that they are under a constant threat, and the 
decision to use lethal force must be understood with this in mind. 
These considerations support arguments that the killing of 
bin Laden was justified under either standard law-enforcement 
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rules or under what we will describe below as a TK 2 case of 
self-defense or defense of others. They do not explain, however, 
why one should treat the operation as a TK 1 case, in which IHL 
supplies more permissive rules of engagement than the rules 
that would otherwise apply if one imagines, for example, that 
Pakistan’s own police forces—acting on a tip from U.S. 
intelligence officials—conducted the operation themselves. In 
particular, these considerations do not support the blanket rule, 
suggested by Koh’s public statements, that only affirmative 
surrender would have triggered an obligation to take bin Laden 
into custody.158 Like our hypothetical of Gunner on vacation, it 
is hard to see how considerations of military necessity could 
have supported the killing of bin Laden if capture would have 
been feasible, if he was in fact manifestly defenseless, or if the 
circumstances were such that one would demand that law-
enforcement officials attempt capture. 
Additionally, although we hesitate to speculate on the 
accuracy or completeness of the picture provided by unofficial, 
often anonymously sourced accounts, some media reports 
provided a narrative that, if true, raises questions about 
whether the rules of engagement were in fact consistent with 
our reading of IHL. An August 2011 New Yorker article quoted 
an anonymous special-operations officer, reportedly involved in 
the operation, as stating, “[t]here was never any question of 
detaining or capturing him—it wasn’t a split-second decision. 
No one wanted detainees.”159 The same article also described bin 
Laden’s killing as having taken place after Navy SEALs had 
already killed every armed man in the compound, and 
immediately after one serviceman undertook great personal risk 
to clear a path to the al Qaeda leader by bear-hugging a woman 
feared to be armed with explosives.160 The killing was then 
succeeded by approximately thirty minutes of intelligence-
gathering, during which time surviving residents of the 
                                                                                                     
 158. See Koh, supra note 14 (“[C]onsistent with the laws of armed conflict 
and U.S. military doctrine, the U.S. forces were prepared to capture bin Laden if 
he had surrendered in a way that they could safely accept. . . . But where that is 
not the case, those laws authorize use of lethal force . . . .”). 
 159. Schmidle, supra note 4, at 43. 
 160. Id. at 42–43. 
BEYOND WAR 1419 
compound were bound and guarded.161 The special forces then 
departed, taking bin Laden’s body with them.162 Although none 
of these facts are legally conclusive in our view (assuming that 
they provide an accurate picture), they do suggest that the 
decision to kill bin Laden is more difficult to explain by 
reference to potential sources of military advantage, such as a 
desire to avoid personal risk or an inability to take detainees for 
lack of resources or time.163 
Finally, we maintain that avoiding detention is not itself a 
justifiable reason to kill rather than capture under IHL. 
Although one can credibly speak of advantages of avoiding the 
burdens of detention and trial, and from precluding a 
charismatic terrorist leader from exploiting the publicity of legal 
process as a recruiting tool, these are not the sorts of benefits 
embraced by the concept of military advantage, which focuses on 
actions aimed at weakening the military forces of the enemy, 
and not on the realization of broader political goals.164 A policy 
to avoid trial on these grounds would also present irreconcilable 
tensions with the due process guarantees afforded by IHL to 
detainees accused of criminal offenses.165 These guarantees 
affirm that the avoidance of due process is not the type of 
military advantage that IHL generally privileges combatants to 
pursue. 
                                                                                                     
 161. See id. at 43 (describing the cuffing of surviving residents and the 
scouring of the compound). 
 162. See id. at 44 (describing how bin Laden’s body was given Muslim rites 
and then heaved into the sea). 
 163. See id. at 43 (stating that bin Laden was found unarmed and could 
have been taken alive if he had immediately surrendered).  
 164. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY 
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOL I 61–68 (2009) (describing what military advantage entails with 
respect to IHL). 
 165. See POW Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(d) (prohibiting “the passing 
of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”). 
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III. The Lawfulness of Targeted Killings Beyond War 
A. A Typology of Cases 
Thus far, we have focused on so-called TK 1 cases, in which 
IHL is invoked to justify targeted killing. We now turn to cases 
that do not rely on IHL. One case—call it TK 2—involves a 
governmental actor instructed to kill an evildoer who is believed 
to be planning an attack that would endanger the lives of many 
innocent people. The government agent catches up to the evildoer 
seconds before he detonates a bomb that will destroy a residential 
building. The agent thwarts the attack by killing the evildoer. In 
a sense, this case involves a targeted killing, for the government 
named an individual beforehand as a target for killing. 
Nevertheless, the case is uncontroversial because the killing is 
clearly lawful under the domestic laws pertaining to defense of 
self and others.166 Because killing the evildoer was necessary to 
prevent an imminent attack against innocent people, the act is 
obviously justified.167 For this reason, cases like TK 2 do not 
trigger the sort of concerns that make the practice of targeted 
killing morally and legally problematic.  
A more interesting case—call it TK 3—arises when the agent 
kills the evildoer before the attack commences. In some cases it 
could be argued that such a killing is necessary to thwart a future 
attack.168 However, the timing makes it unclear whether the act 
is justified under the conventional understanding of defense of 
self and others. Cases like TK 3 raise the problem of preemptive 
or anticipatory self-defense.169 In these cases, the killing is 
                                                                                                     
 166. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) (stating that the use of 
force is justifiable if “immediately necessary” to protect against an attack). 
 167. Killings that thwart an imminent wrongful attack are clearly justified. 
It is unclear, however, whether killings that thwart a non-imminent future 
attack are justified. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From 
Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 215 (2004) (discussing the 
challenges to stringent imminence requirements in the law). 
 168. See id. at 224 (discussing the “complex” issues raised by anticipatory 
self-defense in the international context). 
 169. See Amos N. Guiora, Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law: 
A Re-Evaluation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 3, 5 (2008) (proposing that 
international law needs to be revised to allow for preemptive action against a 
non-state actor, provided that sufficient intelligence is present). 
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deemed necessary to prevent an attack that is neither imminent 
nor ongoing but is certain to take place in the future.170 Even 
though these cases are difficult to justify under the traditional 
approach to the law of self-defense,171 more modern formulations 
of the rules governing the use of force in protection of the person 
seem to allow enough leeway to justify such acts, at least in some 
circumstances.172 As a result, TK 3 cases are more controversial 
than TK 2 cases, but the legality of such conduct can be justified 
fairly easily by effecting some modifications in the traditional law 
of self-defense.173  
The more difficult and controversial case—call it TK 4—
arises when a named target, one who is believed to be dangerous 
but who is not a member of enemy armed forces, is killed while 
she is not engaging in an attack and when there is no knowledge 
of a specific future attack that the target is planning, which can 
only be prevented by use of lethal force. Arguably, this is the case 
most reflective of the bin Laden killing.174 TK 4 cases are 
                                                                                                     
 170. See id. at 4 n.3 (positing that preemptive self-defense “allows for 
reaction when a serious threat to national security exists,” but in doing so it 
“expands the notion of imminence”). 
 171. These cases are difficult to justify under the traditional law of self-
defense because the deadly force is not used to prevent an imminent attack. This 
is also the problem with providing a justification defense to battered women who 
kill their abusers in nonconfrontational settings. See Joshua Dressler, Battered 
Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 457, 
461 (2006) (introducing the problem of the self-defense justification when the 
domestic abuse is not imminent). 
 172. The Model Penal Code’s self-defense provision authorizes killings that 
are “immediately necessary” to thwart a future attack even if the attack is not 
yet imminent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985); see also Russell Christopher, 
Imminence in Justified Targeted Killing, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND 
MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 253, 256 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David 
Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (“Some argue that targeted killings of 
terrorists [representing continuous and ongoing threats of unlawful aggression] 
do satisfy the imminence requirement.”).  
 173. See Guiora, supra note 169, at 5 (proposing a strict-scrutiny test that 
would allow states to act in self-defense to prevent an attack). 
 174. As a result of the raid on bin Laden’s compound, U.S. officials 
reportedly gained evidence of the al Qaeda leader’s involvement in multiple 
terror plots, but reports do not indicate that officials viewed the raid as 
necessary to prevent a particular, known attack. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & 
Scott Shane, Data From Raid Shows Bin Laden Plotted Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 6, 2011, at A1 (discussing documents taken from the Abbottabad 
compound). 
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problematic because the target does not meet the status-based 
requirements of IHL, and, therefore, the killing cannot be 
justified by appealing to the permissive rules governing the 
targeting of combatants in wartime.175 These cases are also 
difficult to justify under conventionally accepted accounts of 
domestic criminal law defenses, given that it cannot be shown 
that killing the person was necessary to prevent an ongoing or 
future attack.176 As a result, TK 4 cases raise some of the most 
challenging questions about the justifiability of targeted killings. 
In the remainder of this Part, we consider the legality of 
targeted killings under current understandings of the domestic 
criminal law defenses of self-defense, lesser evils, and law-
enforcement authority. Our discussion focuses on U.S. law and 
precedents for illustrative purposes because each of these 
defenses is consistent in definition and scope across most common 
and civil law jurisdictions and finds support in international 
human rights jurisprudence.177 Accordingly, we do not suggest 
targeted killings taking place abroad are themselves subject to 
U.S. criminal law. Moreover, while we examine the legality of TK 
1, TK 2, and TK 3 scenarios, our primary emphasis is on the 
potential justification of killing in TK 4 cases. 
B. Targeted Killing as Traditional Defense of Self or Others 
One way to argue for the legality of targeted killings is to 
invoke the traditional law of self-defense or defense of others. It is 
worth clarifying that we refer to the domestic law of self-defense 
rather than to the international rule that authorizes countries to 
resort to force in the exercise of so-called national self-defense. 
Pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, states have 
                                                                                                     
 175. See supra Part II (discussing the treatment of targeted killings under 
the conventions of jus ad bellum). 
 176. TK 4 cases are difficult to justify under both traditional and expansive 
formulations of the law of defense of self and others. See Christopher, supra note 
172, at 255 (stating that, because terrorists are not combatants, targeting them 
for killing cannot be justified under the existing self-defense paradigms). 
 177. See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 11, at 232 (summarizing the 
circumstances, based on a review of international legal sources, in which lethal 
force may be used). 
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a right to use force in order to thwart an armed attack against 
the nation.178 As we have already described, this right is the 
source of much debate in ways critical to the legality of a 
targeted-killing policy that crosses international borders. That 
debate, however, is largely outside the scope of this Article 
because it is principally concerned with breaches of state 
sovereignty, rather than the rules pertaining to killing itself. Not 
all cases, moreover, will implicate problems of state sovereignty. 
A state, for example, may avoid sovereignty concerns by inviting 
a foreign government onto its territory to carry out targeted 
killings, but that consent does not make the killings themselves 
legal.179  
Domestic self-defense can sometimes succeed when the 
international law of self-defense fails. It is plausible to imagine a 
targeted killing that can be justified under the domestic law of 
self-defense but cannot be justified under the international rules 
governing the use of force. Imagine, for example, an intelligence 
officer who is dispatched overseas to monitor a suspected 
terrorist. Suppose that the officer kills the terrorist right before 
the terrorist is to detonate a bomb inside a restaurant that will 
kill several innocent people. Putting aside whether the officer is 
otherwise legally present in the state, his actions do not implicate 
the international rules governing the use of force. The killing of a 
single individual in this manner does not rise to the level of an 
“armed attack” under Article 51.180 At most, he might be guilty of 
murder, but he is not in this case because the killing is easily 
                                                                                                     
 178. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . .”). 
 179. See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 268 (“While Yemen can consent 
to another state entering its territory, . . . it cannot consent to that state 
violating IHL or human rights law while there. Thus, some lawful justification 
for the use of deadly force must still be identified.”). 
 180. See TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: 
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 378 (2010) (examining what 
constitutes an “armed attack” in the context of modern warfare); Kirsten 
Schmalenbach, The Right of Self-Defense and the ‘War on Terrorism’ One Year 
After September 11, 3 GERMAN L.J. 63, 63 (2002), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=189 (noting 
that under the traditional concept of Article 51, the armed attack has to be 
“comparable to inter-state combat in its scale and effects”). 
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justified under the domestic law of individual self-defense or 
defense of others, which allows a person to kill an aggressor in 
defense of self or others if he reasonably believes that killing the 
aggressor is necessary in order to repel an imminent and 
unlawful threat of death or serious bodily injury.181 The killing of 
the terrorist thus amounts to a justifiable act of individual 
defense of self or others as long as it was reasonable to believe 
that the act was necessary to save the lives of third parties, which 
it surely was.  
The law of domestic self-defense is therefore well equipped to 
deal with cases such as TK 2, in which an evildoer is killed just 
before he engages in conduct that would endanger the lives of 
others. Nevertheless, as we have already described, the domestic 
law of self-defense cannot be invoked to justify targeted killings 
in TK 3 cases, in which an evildoer is killed in order to prevent a 
future but non-imminent attack—at least not as this body of law 
has been understood traditionally. The conventionally accepted 
account of the domestic law of self-defense authorizes killings 
only when this course of action is believed to be necessary to repel 
an unlawful and imminent threat.182 Therefore, assuming that 
the evildoer is poised to engage in an attack that will take place 
sometime in the next few days, weeks, or months, rather than 
shortly after he is killed, his killing cannot be justified under the 
traditional law of domestic self-defense. Such cases fall within 
what criminal theorists call “preventive” self-defense, which, 
although hotly debated, is almost universally recognized to fall 
outside of the core of traditional justifiable self-defensive 
action.183 
                                                                                                     
 181. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 2004) (stating that a 
person may “use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he 
or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself”); People v. 
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y. 1986) (recognizing that self-defense permits the 
use of deadly force when the actor reasonably believes use of such force is 
necessary to repel an imminent attack). 
 182. See FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 64, at 90–91 (discussing how an 
imminence requirement helps to distinguish self-defense from unlawful 
preemptive attacks and punitive reprisals). 
 183. Id. at 162 (noting that preventative self-defense is analogous to 
describing war as “politics by other means”). 
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If domestic self-defense cannot legally justify killing in TK 3 
cases, it a fortiori cannot justify killing in TK 4 cases, in which an 
evildoer who does not pose an imminent threat is killed despite a 
lack of specific knowledge of planned future attacks that would be 
thwarted by the killing. The nonexistence of an imminent threat 
is, once again, fatal to any purported claim of justification under 
the domestic law of self-defense in these types of cases. As a 
result, the laws of individual self-defense are useful only in 
justifying targeted killings in easy cases, in which no one but the 
most radical pacifist would oppose the use of force. The laws of 
individual self-defense fail to justify targeted killings in the more 
complicated TK 3 and TK 4 scenarios. 
C. Targeted Killing as Expanded Defense of Self or Others 
If the most controversial aspects of the practice of targeted 
killings cannot be legally justified by appealing to the traditional 
formulation of the law of self-defense, perhaps a more modern 
and expanded version of self-defense can better justify these acts. 
Common reformulations start by arguing that the concurrence of 
an “imminent attack” should not be considered amongst the 
conditions that trigger the justifiable use of deadly force against 
another.184  
Why do some scholars argue in favor of abandoning the 
imminence requirement? One reason is that there are situations 
in which it seems the only way of repelling a future deadly attack 
is to use force in a nonconfrontational situation before the attack 
becomes imminent.185 These cases present a conflict between 
necessity and imminence.186 For Jane to save her own life, it 
might be necessary to kill Bill when he is not attacking her. If she 
                                                                                                     
 184. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 172, at 255 (asserting that the 
imminence requirement, which “bars targeted killing of terrorists, should be 
rejected”).  
 185. See, e.g., FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 64, at 163 (“Suppose a terrorist 
threatens to implant an undetectable nuclear device that is set to explode in a 
year. He can be stopped now, but once the device is implanted, it will be too 
late.”). 
 186. For a lucid discussion of the tensions between imminence and 
necessity, see Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who 
Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 380 (1993).  
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waits for an attack, she stands no chance. If the necessity of using 
force is deemed to be more important than the concurrence of an 
imminent attack, then Jane’s preemptive strike ought to be 
justified. If, on the contrary, imminence trumps necessity, then 
Jane’s anticipatory use of force should not be justified.  
The debate is of significant practical importance in battered 
women cases, in which wives defend the killing of their husbands 
in nonconfrontational situations, such as when their husbands 
are asleep, on the ground that waiting until the attack became 
imminent would have prevented the wives from successfully 
curbing the future attack that the husbands would have surely 
launched.187 Normally, of course, one would demand that the 
victim call the authorities to prevent a non-imminent attack, but 
in some cases the battered spouse has reached out to authorities 
to no avail, indicating that authorities are unwilling or unable to 
help her.188  
There are many who argue that in such cases the traditional 
law of self-defense should give way, the imminence requirement 
should be relaxed or abandoned, and the emphasis should be 
placed on whether or not the use of force is necessary to prevent 
the future attack.189 There are also many staunch supporters of 
the imminence requirement who oppose such an expansion of 
self-defense law.190 Regardless of which of these views is more 
                                                                                                     
 187. This is the issue presented in the well–known case of State v. Norman. 
See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989) (concluding that a woman who 
had been physically and mentally abused by her husband over period of several 
years, and who had been diagnosed as suffering from battered woman’s 
syndrome, was not acting in self-defense when, in order to prevent future abuse, 
she shot her husband while he slept). Much ink has been spilled analyzing the 
issues raised by Norman. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 171, at 458 (suggesting 
that expanding self-defense to include nonconfrontational homicide would be a 
mistake); Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered 
Woman, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 342, 343 (2007) (arguing that the imminence rule 
is an essential element of the law of self-defense and should not be modified). 
 188. See Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 19 (stating that a police officer told the wife 
that “he could do nothing for her unless she took out a warrant on her husband” 
and left, even after the wife said that “if she [took out a warrant], her husband 
would kill her”).  
 189. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 186, at 380 (“If action is really necessary to 
avert a threatened harm, society should allow the action, or at least not punish 
it, even if the harm is not imminent.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Ferzan, supra note 167, at 217 (positing that “imminence 
serves as the actus reus for aggression, separating those threats that we may 
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normatively appealing, it is worth noting that the more modern 
and expansive account of self-defense is slowly but surely gaining 
supporters. The Model Penal Code’s formulation of the defense 
rejects the imminent-attack limitation on the use of force in 
defense of self or others, and instead includes the more lenient 
and necessity-based requirement that the force be immediately 
necessary to repel an unlawful aggression.191 Assuming, for the 
sake of argument, that this position is correct, can it serve to 
justify targeted killings in the more interesting and complicated 
cases discussed here? 
For starters, an expanded version of self-defense that does 
away with the imminence requirement fares better in justifying 
TK 3 cases than the traditional imminence-based account of self-
defense. In such scenarios, much like in certain battered-women 
cases,192 deadly force is used to prevent a near certain future 
attack, and waiting until the future aggression becomes 
imminent will significantly reduce or even eliminate the 
defender’s chance of successfully warding off the aggression. As 
long as the use of such force is the only way of thwarting the 
future attack, the absence of imminence does not preclude a 
finding of legal justification under the more expansive necessity-
based account of self-defense.193 This is precisely the argument 
recently put forth by Russell Christopher as a possible 
justification for targeted killings.194 Building primarily on what 
                                                                                                     
properly defend against from mere inchoate and potential threats” and it 
therefore “is independent of the needs of the defender”). 
 191. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1985) (“The use of deadly force is 
not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is 
necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or 
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat . . . .”). 
 192. See, e.g., Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 9 (concluding that a woman who 
suffered from battered woman’s syndrome was not acting in self-defense when 
she shot her husband while he slept in order to prevent future abuse); see also 
Dressler, supra note 171, at 459–61 (detailing the constant verbal and physical 
abuse that Judy Norman endured from her husband and discussing whether 
Mrs. Norman was justified in killing her husband despite the lack of an 
imminent attack). 
 193. See Rosen, supra note 186, at 404–07 (discussing the viability of a self-
defense statute without an imminence requirement).  
 194. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
imminence requirement is becoming easier to satisfy).  
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others before him have argued in the context of battered-women 
cases, Christopher argues that the absence of an imminent attack 
need not be fatal to the claim that targeted killings ought to be 
justified under the rubric of self-defense.195  
What Christopher does not do, however, is explain whether 
this expanded version of self-defense can account for the legality 
of TK 4 cases. Unfortunately for those who believe that targeted 
killing can be justified even in some TK 4 cases, the paradigm of 
expanded self-defense is inadequate. The problem is that TK 4 
cases involve killing an individual who is believed to be 
dangerous, without any degree of certainty about whether doing 
so is necessary to prevent a future attack. Although in such cases 
the agent has knowledge that the evildoer is dangerous and that, 
in light of his past acts, he will likely attack again in the future, 
there is no concrete evidence of specific future attacks that can 
only be prevented by killing him. An expanded version of self-
defense would thus fail to justify such killings because the 
essential element of the defense—that the use of force be 
necessary to prevent the death or serious bodily injury of third 
parties—is missing. 
D. Targeted Killing as Law-Enforcement Action 
Claire Finkelstein has suggested that some targeted killings 
might be legally justified by appealing to the rules governing the 
use of deadly force pursuant to law-enforcement authority.196 In 
particular, Finkelstein contends that law-enforcement authority 
can justify targeted killings that are not justified by the law of 
defense of self or others.197 Can law-enforcement authority justify 
                                                                                                     
 195. See Christopher, supra note 172, at 284 (concluding that “[t]he 
imminence requirement for justified self-defense is problematic and should be 
abandoned”). 
 196. See Claire Finkelstein, Targeted Killing as Preemptive Action, in 
TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 156, 178–79 
(Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (arguing 
that “there is justification for the use of force . . . as applied to a targeted killing 
situation” and that the justification is “most clearly demonstrated by certain 
domestic law enforcement circumstances”). 
 197. See id. at 179 (considering the reach of law-enforcement authority in 
cases in which the standard justifications are inapplicable). 
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these more controversial cases? It depends on the scope of the 
rules governing law-enforcement authority, an issue that 
Finkelstein unfortunately does not address in much detail.  
U.S. legal history demonstrates the complexity of the issue. 
At early common law, deadly force could be used by law-
enforcement agents to arrest a fleeing felon.198 The right to use 
such force was quite expansive because its use was not 
conditioned on whether the fleeing felon posed a danger to the 
officer or to third parties.199 Deadly force could also be used to 
prevent the commission of a felony.200 This expansive view of law-
enforcement authority subsequently eroded in many states, 
either by statute or case law.201 Presently, many, if not most, 
states limit the use of deadly force by government officials to the 
prevention of violent felonies.202 The Model Penal Code adopted a 
similar limit on the use of deadly force by law-enforcement 
officers, which is authorized pursuant to Section 3.07 if the crime 
for which the arrest is made involved the use or threatened use of 
deadly force.203  
Although the common law rules are fairly clear and easy to 
apply, the U.S. Supreme Court complicated matters when it 
held that the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
seizures placed constitutional limits on the amount of force that 
a police officer may use to make an arrest.204 In Tennessee v. 
                                                                                                     
 198. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 21.03 (6th ed. 
2012) (discussing the rules governing use of deadly force at common law). 
 199. See id. (noting that the common law crime-prevention defense “is 
remarkably broad in that it authorizes use of necessary deadly force to prevent 
nonviolent felonies”). 
 200. See id. (explaining that deadly force at common law is justified if the 
user of force reasonably believes such other person is committing a felony).  
 201. Id.; see also, e.g., People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241, 245 (Cal. 1974) 
(adopting the common law rule that the use of deadly force to prevent a felony is 
justifiable only if the offense is a “forcible and atrocious crime”).  
 202. DRESSLER, supra note 198. 
 203. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b) (1981) (explaining that deadly force 
is not justified unless the actor believes “the crime for which the arrest is made 
involve[s] conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force”). There 
are additional requirements that must be met under § 3.07 before deadly force 
by law enforcement is authorized. See id. § 3.07 (listing the requisite elements 
that justify use of deadly force). 
 204. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985) (rejecting the 
argument that, as long as there is probable cause to warrant an arrest, the 
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Garner,205 the Court held that the killing of a fleeing unarmed 
youth suspected of committing a nonviolent felony amounted to 
an unreasonable seizure that ran afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment.206 Subsequently, the Court held in Scott v. Harris207 
that the police could use deadly force by ramming a fleeing 
driver’s car from behind because the driver’s reckless conduct 
could have jeopardized the life or limb of other motorists.208 It is 
unclear whether these cases impose additional limits on the use 
of deadly force pursuant to law-enforcement authority, beyond 
the ones statutorily in place in most states today.209  
Regardless of whether the U.S. Constitution imposes 
additional limitations on the use of deadly force by governmental 
agents, it is fairly obvious that police officers may sometimes use 
more force than private citizens would be allowed to employ 
pursuant to the law of self-defense and defense of others. The 
facts of Harris constitute a case in point. The police officers in 
Harris were allowed to use deadly force against the fleeing 
motorist even though the motorist was not endangering the life or 
limb of third parties at the time force was used.210 While the 
driver’s conduct was reckless and dangerous in the abstract (it 
could have endangered someone had someone been there), there 
was no evidence that the life or bodily integrity of another 
motorist was in imminent danger at the moment the police 
                                                                                                     
Fourth Amendment has no role in determining how an arrest is made).  
 205. See id. at 22 (holding that an officer’s use of lethal force without 
adequate physical threat of harm was unconstitutional). 
 206. See id. at 20–21 (stating that the officer did not have probable cause to 
believe the suspect posed any physical danger). 
 207. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (“A police officer’s attempt 
to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of 
innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it 
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”). 
 208. See id. at 383–84 (balancing the extent of the intrusion on the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests against the government’s interests 
and finding that the latter prevails because of the number of innocent lives at 
risk). 
 209. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 13–19 (considering the 
common law rule and the history of other jurisdictions’ rules). 
 210. See id. at 384–86 (finding that the Fourth Amendment did not prevent 
the police officers from using deadly force against a fleeing motorist who had not 
definitively placed any lives in imminent danger). 
BEYOND WAR 1431 
rammed the driver’s car.211 The reasonable possibility of future 
harm that might be caused by the motorist seemed to be 
sufficient to justify using deadly force. Such reasonable 
probability of future harm would not be enough to trigger the 
imminence requirement in self-defense.  
Applied to targeted killings, the rules governing the use of 
deadly force by law-enforcement officers could authorize using 
deadly force against the evildoer if he is fleeing. In many 
targeted-killing cases, the person targeted is suspected of 
criminal responsibility for grave atrocities, which would satisfy 
the violent-felony requirement, assuming the accusations can be 
substantiated. The problem, however, is that law-enforcement 
authority justifies the use of deadly force only to prevent a felon 
from escaping or to thwart the imminent commission of a violent 
felony.212 In TK 4 cases (as well as in many TK 3 cases), however, 
the person targeted is not fleeing and might not even be aware 
that the agent is targeting him.213 Also, the targeted individual in 
these cases is not about to commit a crime when he is targeted. 
Therefore, the version of law-enforcement authority that has 
prevailed in domestic law cannot justify using force in the more 
complicated and controversial TK 4 cases unless the targeted 
suspect is fleeing or about to commit a crime. 
E. Targeted Killings as Necessity or Lesser Evils 
Perhaps some targeted killings can be justified as cases of 
necessity or lesser evils. Under the Model Penal Code, an actor is 
entitled to a lesser-evils or necessity justification if she inflicts an 
evil in order to prevent an even greater evil.214 Thus, the person 
                                                                                                     
 211. See id. at 384 (acknowledging that there was a less than certain 
probability that the defendant’s actions would cause death). 
 212. See DRESSLER, supra note 198, § 21.03 (explaining the circumstances in 
which deadly force is permissible under the modern majority rule). 
 213. This would almost always be the case when the targeted killing is 
carried out by way of an aerial strike. For obvious reasons, most targeted 
individuals will not be aware of the fact that they are about to be killed by a 
missile or a drone strike.  
 214. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1985) (providing that conduct one 
believes to be necessary to avoid harm to oneself or another is justifiable if “the 
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to 
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who breaks a car window without the owner’s consent in order to 
save a child who is suffocating inside the car acts justifiably 
pursuant to the lesser-evils defense. Although her conduct 
nominally satisfies the elements of the offense of criminal 
mischief,215 it is not considered wrongful because the evil 
prevented by the act (the death of a child) is greater than the evil 
inflicted (damage to the property). Similarly, it could be argued 
that killing the targeted individual may sometimes be justified 
because doing so prevents the occurrence of some greater harm. 
Perhaps, for example, by killing the target, one can foil the 
target’s plot to bomb a residential building. Doing so would save 
dozens or hundreds of people by killing one. Although it is 
controversial whether one can ever kill a person in order to save 
other people in circumstances other than self-defense or law-
enforcement authority,216 many have argued that such killings 
ought to be justified if the amount of people saved by the conduct 
is considerable.  
Fernando Tesón has recently defended some targeted killings 
by appealing to a logic similar to the one undergirding the lesser-
evils justification.217 More specifically, he argues that it might 
sometimes be justified to engage in the targeted killing of an evil 
                                                                                                     
be prevented by the law defining the offense charged”). For the defense to 
succeed, there must also be no statutory exceptions relevant to the specific facts 
involved, and there must be no apparent legislative purpose preventing the 
situation from being deemed justifiable. Id. § 3.02(1)(b)–(c).  
 215. The Texas Penal Code is representative of a criminal-mischief statute, 
stating that the offense is committed when a person “intentionally or knowingly 
damages or destroys the tangible property of the owner.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 28.03(a)(1) (2009). This is one of three ways in which criminal mischief can be 
committed in Texas. See id. § 28.03(a)(2)–(3) (providing for an offense if one 
causes pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience to another or makes 
markings on the tangible property of another).  
 216. The German Federal Constitutional Court struck down a law 
authorizing the government to shoot down a plane headed toward a heavily 
populated area, ruling that the state does not have a right to take innocent life 
even if doing so is the only way of saving hundreds of people. 
Bundesvergfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 
2006, 1 BVR 357/05, ¶ 137, 2006 (Ger.). According to the Court, authorizing such 
action would violate the dignity of the passengers inside the plane, for they 
would be treated as fungible objects that can be killed as long as more lives are 
saved than destroyed. Id. ¶ 34. 
 217. See Tesón, supra note 93, at 405, 411 (discussing the narrow 
circumstances in which he asserts that targeted killings are not immoral). 
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ruler or a terrorist if doing so prevents him from killing hundreds 
or thousands of people.218 It is important to note that Tesón’s 
proposal justifies the targeted killing only if engaging in such 
tactics is the only way to prevent the en masse killing of human 
beings.219 According to Tesón, this means that, in the sui generis 
context of terrorism, “the state reasonably knows that acting now 
may be its only chance to avert a terrorist strike.”220 
Tesón’s proposal illustrates how and when the lesser-evils 
defense can be invoked to justify targeted killings. Although 
Tesón’s argument is plausible, it has at least two limitations for 
purposes of our analysis. First, and taking into account that 
Tesón does not impose an imminence requirement, it is unclear 
whether his justification for targeted killings is any different 
from the expanded defense of self or others justification that we 
have already described. If killing the target now is the only way 
to thwart a future threat to innocent lives, it would seem that 
engaging in such conduct would also be justified under the 
expanded concept of self-defense. Perhaps the most important 
contribution of this proposal, therefore, is its novel approach to 
the international-relations dimension of targeted killing: the 
ability to save a substantial number of lives may explain why a 
particular state may violate the territorial integrity of another 
state to carry out the killing.  
Second, and more importantly, Tesón’s proposal cannot 
justify killings in TK 4 scenarios, for it is the nature of such cases 
that it is not known with any certainty whether the targeted 
individual was about to launch an attack. Although it is 
reasonable to believe that the individuals targeted in cases like 
TK 4 could help plan or launch future attacks, there is no 
concrete evidence about specific plans that can only be thwarted 
by killing the person. This is why it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to invoke traditional lesser-evils principles to justify targeted 
killings in TK 4 scenarios. Given that the government official in 
                                                                                                     
 218. See id. at 423 (proposing that targeted killing of terrorists in a 
peacetime setting is permissible “only when necessary to prevent the deaths of a 
substantial number of innocent persons”). 
 219. See id. (explaining that it must be impossible or prohibitive to capture 
the target for a targeted killing to be justified). 
 220. Id. at 427. 
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such cases is unaware of any specific future (and reasonably 
imminent) attacks that would be foiled by killing the target, it 
cannot be said with any reasonable degree of certainty that 
killing the individual is indeed the only way to prevent the killing 
of innocent human beings in the future.  
IV. Another Paradigm for Targeted Killings? The Killing of Pablo 
Escobar 
Pablo Escobar was one of the most infamous criminals of the 
late twentieth century.221 Escobar was the head of the “Cartel de 
Medellín,” Colombia’s largest and most feared criminal 
organization.222 At its zenith, the Cartel de Medellín was one of 
the most successful and sprawling criminal organizations of all 
time, smuggling tons of cocaine into the United States on a 
weekly basis.223  
Escobar kept his grip on power by employing a double 
strategy. First, he would create a loyal following amongst many 
people living in dire poverty, especially in his hometown of 
Medellín and, more generally, in the province of Antioquia.224 He 
did this by building housing complexes for the poor, helping the 
needy, and performing other charitable acts, such as building 
soccer fields with lighting so that workers could play at night.225 
Although Escobar tried to get these sectors of the population to 
love him, he simultaneously attempted to get governmental 
                                                                                                     
 221. See MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO: THE HUNT FOR THE WORLD’S 
GREATEST OUTLAW 59 (2001) (noting that, by 1989, Escobar was “one of the 
richest men in the world, and perhaps its most infamous criminal”). At least ten 
books have been written about Pablo Escobar, including books written by his 
accountant, some of his lovers, and some of his coconspirators. See, e.g., 
ROBERTO ESCOBAR & DAVID FISHER, THE ACCOUNTANT’S STORY: INSIDE THE 
VIOLENT WORLD OF THE MEDELLÍN CARTEL, at inside cover (2009) (stating that 
Pablo Escobar’s brother, Roberto Escobar, is the author of the book and was the 
top accountant for the Medellín Cartel). 
 222. At one time, Escobar’s Cartel “dominated the cocaine traffic through 
Colombia to the United States.” Death of a Cocaine King, BALT. SUN, Dec. 4, 
1993, at 8A.  
 223.  ESCOBAR & FISHER, supra note 221, at viii. 
 224.  See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 28–29 (noting that Escobar was one of 
Medellín’s largest employers and spent millions of dollars improving the city).  
 225. Id. at 29. 
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actors to fear him.226 He did this by implementing, with ruthless 
efficiency, his infamous policy colloquially known as “plata o 
plomo.”227 Translated literally, the phrase means “silver or 
lead,”228 which meant that one would either have to accept bribes 
to allow Escobar to continue his business or face the bullet fire 
that would ensue if one refused to do so.229 The policy was a huge 
success for Escobar, as he was able to bribe most government 
officials who could have gotten in his way.230 Those who could not 
be bribed were often killed.231 There is even evidence that he 
managed to kill a popular presidential candidate who had 
publicly vowed to go after Escobar with all of the government’s 
might.232 When such strategies failed to work, it is believed that 
Escobar would resort to even more sinister means, including 
terroristic strategies such as suicide and commercial-aircraft 
bombings.233 Some have even suggested that Escobar was 
involved in the murder of nearly half of the justices of the 
Colombian Supreme Court, carried out by guerillas from the 19th 
of April Movement.234  
                                                                                                     
 226. See id. at 24–29 (describing citizens’ love for Escobar and government 
officials’ fear of him). 
 227. Id. at 24.  
 228. See id. (providing the English translation of the phrase). 
 229. See id. (“One either accepted [Escobar’s] plata (silver) or his plomo 
(lead).”). 
 230. See, e.g., id. at 52 (detailing Escobar’s bribes of the Columbia Attorney 
General and judiciary).  
 231. At least 228 judges and court officers were killed during the 1980s. 
Steven Gutkin, Colombia Trying to Repair Judicial System Battered by 
Organized Crime, TIMES-NEWS (Hendersonville, N.C.), Jan. 10, 1991, at 25.  
 232. See Brian Byrnes, Sins of the Father, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 12, 2009, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/11/12/sins-of-the-father.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (stating that Escobar ordered the death of presidential 
candidate Luis Carlos Galàn) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 233. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 80–81 (describing an airline bombing 
plot ordered by Escobar). Escobar was implicated in the downing of an Avianca 
airliner in an unsuccessful effort to kill then-presidential-hopeful César Gaviria. 
Id. at 59.  
 234. See id. at 52–53 (discussing Escobar’s targeting of Colombia’s judicial 
system in the 1980s). The 19th of April Movement—known in Colombia as the 
M-19—was a Colombian guerrilla group that operated in the 1970s and 1980s. 
STEPHEN E. ATKINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN WORLDWIDE EXTREMISTS AND 
EXTREMIST GROUPS 185 (2004).  
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Eventually, Escobar decided to strike a deal with Colombian 
authorities in order to avoid extradition to the United States, 
where he was wanted for various drug-related offenses.235 The 
terms of the deal were quite favorable to Escobar. He would 
surrender only if the government agreed to give him a lenient 
sentence and to not extradite him.236 Escobar also demanded that 
he serve his prison time in a facility that he himself would build 
for the purposes of serving his sentence.237 He was eventually 
sentenced to five years of imprisonment and was allowed to serve 
his sentence in the facility he built, which came to be known as 
“La Catedral” (meaning “The Cathedral”).238 More Ritz Carlton 
than San Quentin, La Catedral was essentially a mansion 
equipped with a discotheque, gym, “dirt bike track,” and several 
“chalets” for entertaining his female friends.239 His pseudo-
imprisonment did not stop his drug dealings, as he was able to 
surround himself with “prison guards” who were loyal to him and 
allowed him to meet with clients and continue managing his 
criminal enterprise.240 
A little over a year after his sentence, Escobar murdered a 
pair of subordinates whom he believed to be disloyal to him.241 
This was the impetus for then-President of Colombia César 
Gaviria to order the transfer of Escobar to a real correctional 
facility.242 Unfortunately for the government, Escobar was able to 
                                                                                                     
 235. See, e.g., U.S. Charges Escobar for Jetliner Bombing, WILLIAMSON DAILY 
NEWS, Aug. 14, 1992, at 17. 
 236. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 96–97 (describing Escobar’s deal with 
the Colombian government to avoid extradition to the United States). 
 237. See Prison Prepares to Welcome Drug Billionaire, TORONTO STAR, June 
16, 1991, at H3 (noting that Escobar “could equip the room as he wished,” which 
would be “no problem” considering his “personal fortune of $3 billion”).  
 238. See id. (referring to the location from which the article was reported as 
“La Catedral, Columbia”). 
 239. DOMINIC STREATFEILD, COCAINE: AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 444 
(2001). 
 240. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 110 (“The prison guards were no more 
than Pablo’s employees . . . .”). 
 241. See id. at 118 (describing how Escobar had two of his “powerful 
lieutenants” killed because he was “[s]uspicious . . . of their loyalty”). 
 242. See id. at 120 (describing President Gaviria’s decision, after the 
killings, to move Escobar “to a real prison”). 
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learn of the plan beforehand.243 Although the prison was 
surrounded by “an entire brigade of the Colombian army, roughly 
four hundred men,” Escobar managed to escape unharmed.244 
A. Killing Escobar 
Escobar’s escape from La Catedral was the last straw for the 
Colombian government. With full knowledge that capturing 
Escobar would require more training and resources than those 
that Colombia could offer at the time, the government turned to 
the United States for help.245 The same year that Escobar escaped 
from his prison hotel, agents from the United States’ elite combat 
team, Delta Force, started training and advising the Colombian 
police and military.246 This led to the creation of the “Bloque de 
Búsqueda” (Search Bloc),247 a Colombian police force trained and 
assisted by Delta Force that was tasked with finding and 
capturing Escobar.248 Commanded by Colonel Hugo Martínez, 
members of the Search Bloc were meticulously screened to ferret 
out any prospective agent that might be susceptible to corruption, 
or who might already be working as a spy for Escobar.249 The 
Search Bloc was also assisted by a U.S. Army special unit known 
as Centra Spike250 and American planes, which provided vital 
                                                                                                     
 243. See id. at 123 (“[B]ecause of radio and TV reports, Escobar . . . knew 
that armed forces were massing around his prison. Any hope of surprise was 
gone.”). 
 244. Id. at 134. 
 245. See id. at 140 (noting that, in seeking help from the United States, 
Gavaria had “opened the door to anything”). 
 246. See id. at 141–42 (describing U.S. officials’ deliberations, and ultimate 
decision, to use Delta Force to track down Escobar in Colombia).  
 247. Id. at 66. 
 248. See Inquiry Details U.S. Role in Killing of Drug Lord, LAKELAND 
LEDGER, Nov. 12, 2000, at A5 (noting the involvement of the Delta Force in the 
Escobar operation and that “U.S. officials . . . acknowledged training the Search 
Bloc”).  
 249. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 67 (noting that officers on the Search 
Bloc could not be “native Antioquian[s]” from Escobar’s home town and that the 
men chosen were “considered elite and incorruptible”). 
 250. See id. at 73 (describing Centra Spike and its purpose); Mark Bowden, 
Quietly, Search Bloc Pins Escobar Down, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 14, 2000, at A2 
(noting that “American surveillance experts at Centra Spike” worked with the 
Search Bloc to locate Escobar). 
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intelligence that proved decisive in tracking down Escobar.251 The 
United States agreed to provide all of this help pursuant to 
President Reagan’s 1986 order that declared drug trafficking to 
be a threat to the national security of the country, and thus 
authorized the use of military assets to assist police forces in 
neutralizing the threat.252  
While the Search Bloc was hunting Escobar down, a vigilante 
group—financed both by Escobar’s enemies in the drug world and 
by right-wing paramilitaries—began a bloody campaign designed 
to weaken Escobar by killing his closest associates and relatives 
and to exact vengeance for what he had done to them and the 
country.253 The group called themselves “Los Pepes,” which stood 
for “Los Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar” (People Persecuted by 
Pablo Escobar).254 Los Pepes were almost as ruthless as Escobar, 
often employing the same tactics that Escobar used to terrorize 
his enemies.255 The group would achieve its objective by any 
means necessary, including planting bombs, setting fire to 
Escobar’s property, and murdering many of his lawyers, bankers, 
and extended family.256 There is also much evidence suggesting 
that there was some collaboration between the Search Bloc and 
Los Pepes and, indirectly, between the American military and 
Los Pepes.257 While there is no direct evidence linking the Search 
                                                                                                     
 251. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 154 (noting the volume of U.S. military 
aircraft monitoring Escobar’s activity over Medellín).  
 252. See id. at 54 (noting that National Security Decision Directive 221, 
signed in 1986, “opened the door to direct [U.S.] military involvement in the war 
on drugs”). 
 253. See id. at 176–77 (describing Los Pepes, a group committed to 
retaliating against Escobar and his associates); Los Pepes: Sed de Venganza, EL 
TIEMPO, Dec. 2, 1993, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-278283 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (describing Los Pepes and their retaliation efforts) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 254. BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 176. 
 255. See id. (“If [Escobar] stood atop an organizational mountain that 
consisted of family, bankers, sicarios, and lawyers, then perhaps the only way to 
get him was to take down the mountain.”). 
 256. See id. at 191–95 (listing Escobar’s associates that were targets in the 
“bloodbath”). 
 257. See Mark Bowden, U.S. Spy Data, Vigilante Killings Start to Coincide, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 1, 2000, http://articles.philly.com/2000-12-01/news/ 
25579871_1_escobar-vigilante-squad-los-pepes (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) 
(stating that “[m]ore and more of the people identified by Centra Spike’s 
Beechcraft spy planes were turning up dead” in killings orchestrated by Los 
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Bloc and the American military to the perpetration of the crimes 
committed by Los Pepes, some have suggested that both the 
United States and the Colombian government tolerated the 
actions carried out by Los Pepes, albeit never expressly approving 
of them.258  
Slowly but surely, the combined pressure exerted by the 
Search Bloc and Los Pepes wore Escobar down. By 1993, he was 
constantly on the run and feared not only that the Search Bloc 
would catch up to him, but also that Los Pepes would kill his wife 
and children.259 On December 2, 1993, the Search Bloc located 
Escobar using radio triangulation technology provided by the 
United States.260 After the Search Bloc stormed the Medellín 
house in which Escobar was hiding, Escobar opened fire.261 
Realizing that he was outnumbered and outgunned, Escobar 
jumped out of a window and started running across the roofs of 
surrounding houses in a desperate attempt to escape.262 Members 
of the Search Bloc shot and killed Escobar on the spot.263 He was 
shot three times: once in the leg, once in the torso, and a fatal 
shot in his ear.264 Although the exact circumstances of his death 
are unknown, it is widely believed that Escobar was executed by 
the police, as there is evidence tending to demonstrate that the 
fatal shot was fired after Escobar was already neutralized by the 
Search Bloc.265 
                                                                                                     
Pepes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 258. See id. (noting that “[i]f Los Pepes were working with the Search Bloc, 
that would explain their apparent access to fresh U.S. intelligence” but that any 
evidence of “American linkage with Los Pepes remained circumstantial” at 
best). 
 259. See Escobar on Run from Vigilante Attacks, TOLEDO BLADE, Feb. 28, 
1993, at D5 (noting that Escobar was “on the run and getting what he dishes 
out” from Los Pepes, who recently bombed the homes of his “family members”). 
 260. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 239–43 (describing the details of 
locating Escobar with radio triangulation).  
 261. See Drug Lord Escobar Killed in Shootout, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Dec. 
3, 1993, at 1A, 19A (describing the Search Bloc’s raid and ensuing shootout at 
Escobar’s home in Medellín). 
 262. BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 248.  
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 253.  
 265. See id. (opining that “[t]he shots to his leg and back most likely would 
have knocked him down, but probably would not have killed him,” thus making 
it more likely that Escobar was “shot in the head after [he] fell”). 
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B. Domestic and International Reaction to Escobar’s Killing 
Most Colombians received the news of Escobar’s death with 
jubilation.266 His demise marked an important milestone for the 
country. The government was finally able to triumph over the 
“biggest and baddest” drug lord the world had ever seen. Stifling 
the Medellín Cartel was a first win in a series of victories over the 
country’s cartels and thugs. The government focused on 
dismantling Escobar’s rivals, especially the Cali Cartel, and 
Colombia embarked on its slow but steady journey to regain 
control over the country.267 First would come the drug cartels and 
then the infamous FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
Colombianas) guerillas.268 Although we do not wish to exaggerate 
the significance of this single event, Escobar’s death played an 
important role in Colombia’s resolution of its security problems. 
Today, the country is characterized by optimism in the fight 
against drug-smuggling and guerillas. There is also cautious 
optimism about the economic growth that goes hand-in-hand with 
the political stability that such victories bring. In recent years, 
Colombia has been doing well economically and politically by 
Latin-American standards.269 Drug- and guerilla-related violence 
is down dramatically from 1990 levels.270 All in all, Colombia is 
                                                                                                     
 266. See id. at 261 (“[T]his day was for celebration.”); see also, e.g., Al Fin 
Cayó Escobar!, EL TIEMPO, Dec. 31, 1993, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/ 
documento/MAM-282510 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (breaking news that 
Escobar was killed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 267. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 272 (discussing the unraveling of the 
Cali cartel). 
 268. See TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY, GUERRILLAS AND REVOLUTION IN 
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 269. See Stephen Manker, Colombia’s Economic Growth to be 3rd Strongest 
in Region for 2011: IMF, COLUMBIA REPORTS, June 17, 2011, 
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growth-to-be-3rd-strongest-in-region-for-2011-imf.html (last visited Sept. 24, 
2012) (stating that Colombia’s economic growth was approximately 5% in the 
first quarter of 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 270. See Enrique S. Pumar, Colombian Immigrants, in MULTICULTURAL 
AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEWEST AMERICANS 353, 371–72 (Ronald H. 
Bayor ed., 2011) (finding that the Colombian government has become regarded 
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now a relatively safe country.271 Escobar’s death was an 
important component of this recovery.  
This is not to say, of course, that Colombia has solved all of 
its problems. The guerrillas retain control over a small portion of 
the country, and drug violence is still a problem.272 Nonetheless, 
Colombia is undeniably a safer, less violent country than it was 
twenty years ago.273 This is due, at least in part, to the 
government’s dismantling of the Medellín cartel, including its 
killing of Escobar.  
Perhaps the most important consequence of Escobar’s death 
was that it proved to the government and to Colombians that 
they were capable of defeating serious threats to their national 
security. The Search Bloc was so effective in tracking down 
Escobar that it was used as a model for other operations carried 
out by the government. Subsequent Search Blocs were successful 
in dismantling most of the remaining drug cartels in the 
country.274 The victory over Escobar also proved to be 
determinative of Colombian–U.S. relationships. The strong ties 
that developed between the two countries continue to thrive to 
this day. The United States has also learned from Colombia’s 
struggle against terrorism and organized crime. After all—as 
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violence” since it began receiving aid from the United States in the year 2000 to 
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 271. See id. at 372 (describing the reduced levels of violence in Colombia). 
 272. See, e.g., Colombia’s Defense Minister Steps Down, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 
31, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2016065962_aplt 
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 273. See, e.g., Vicky Baker, Bogotá’s Age of Rediscovery, GUARDIAN, Aug. 19, 
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 274. See Mark Peceny & Michael Durnan, The FARC’s Best Friend: U.S. 
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LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 95, 105–06 (2006) (noting that the Colombian 
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others have pointed out—the Colombian experience helped the 
United States formulate its post-9/11 counterterrorism policies.275  
In spite of the widespread jubilation with which the news of 
Escobar’s death was received in the country, some Colombians 
were saddened when they learned about his killing.276 For some, 
Escobar was a modern day Robin Hood who took from the 
government and the corrupt rich people and gave back to the 
poor. This was especially the case in some barrios277 of Escobar’s 
hometown of Medellín.278 These were the same people who knew 
of his whereabouts and never said a word to local authorities: the 
silent accomplices of Escobar’s effort to hide from the Search Bloc.  
Most, however, were ready to turn the page and explore what 
a world without Escobar would mean for the country. Of special 
significance is the fact that Escobar’s death failed to attract vocal 
criticism from defenders of civil liberties and individual rights, 
either in Colombia or abroad. This is a telling fact. After all, at 
that time, it was widely rumored that Escobar was killed 
execution-style after he had been incapacitated by shots to the leg 
and torso.279 If so, the fatal shot would have clearly been unlawful 
under domestic and international law. Law-enforcement agents 
can only use deadly force when it is the only way to prevent a 
fleeing felon from escaping.280 But if—as many believe—Escobar 
was already shot down before the fatal shot was fired, the third 
shot was not necessary to prevent his escape.281 The alleged 
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Lessons from the War on Drugs, 45 SURVIVAL 187, 187 (2003) (“Indeed, members 
of the US intelligence community acknowledge that drug enforcement raids in 
Colombia during the 1990s serve as models for today’s counter-terror operations 
in Afghanistan . . . .”). 
 276. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 266 (describing Escobar’s funeral as 
“an occasion for grief” for many Colombians). 
 277. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 179 (1993) (defining 
“barrio” as “a ward, quarter, or district of a city or town in Spanish-speaking 
countries”). 
 278. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 266 (noting that those who lived in 
Medellín were especially aggrieved over Escobar’s death and directed “promises 
of revenge” toward the government). 
 279. See id. at 253–54 (describing the circumstances surrounding Escobar’s 
death and the possibility that he was executed during the Search Bloc’s raid). 
 280. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (stating the common law 
rule that lethal force may be used against a fleeing felon). 
 281. This, in fact, is what journalist Mark Bowden concluded after 
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firefight that erupted between Escobar and the authorities when 
the Search Bloc stormed Escobar’s hiding place does not justify 
his killing either, at least if the aforementioned accounts of the 
incident are believed. Escobar was killed while attempting to 
escape from the police. Assuming that the police agents shot him 
twice and, by doing so, successfully prevented him from escaping, 
the previous firefight did not give them lawful authority to use 
deadly force against him again if, at the time, Escobar was 
already neutralized and no longer posing a threat. 
C. Was Escobar’s Killing Justified? 
Although the facts of Escobar’s killing suggest that 
Colombian authorities may have violated the law, the death did 
not generate outrage amongst the Colombian people, the 
academy, or the international community. At an abstract level, 
this is rather startling. How can the possibility of an extrajudicial 
execution carried out by governmental authorities not raise 
serious concerns? At a more basic level, however, there is nothing 
puzzling about the lack of attention paid to the legality of 
Escobar’s killing. Everyone knew that Escobar was a ruthless 
killer. There was no doubt that he was responsible for some of the 
worst crimes perpetrated in the latter portion of the twentieth 
century. He was still a very dangerous man, and it seemed 
impossible to bring him to justice. Members of the judiciary were 
either in cahoots with him or feared for their lives. There seemed 
to be no way out. Escobar had been imprisoned, and he had 
escaped. Capturing him alive was an option fraught with peril.  
The extrajudicial killing of any human being is a matter of 
grave concern, and there remain powerful arguments against the 
killing of Escobar. We are also mindful that Escobar’s killing did 
not take place in a vacuum, and that the struggle against and 
between Colombia’s drug lords included other extrajudicial 
killings under different, less sympathetic circumstances, 
including many by paramilitary groups suspected of government 
                                                                                                     
examining the evidence. According to Bowden, the evidence suggests that the 
shot that likely killed Escobar “is consistent with a shooter administering a coup 
de grâce while standing over a downed man.” BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 254. 
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ties.282 Our aim is not to endorse Colombian government policy as 
a whole, or even to mount a full-blown defense of the Escobar 
killing. 
Our aim, instead, is more modest: to consider the Escobar 
case in isolation and to identify features that favor its 
justification. Escobar’s case presents, in many ways, the best case 
that could be made for ordering the killing of someone outside of 
war, in circumstances not necessary to prevent the person’s 
escape, or to neutralize an imminent threat to the life or limb of 
government officials or third parties. In other words, Escobar’s 
killing presents us with the best case that can be made for 
justifying a TK 4 case.  
At least three factors seem to favor a justification for 
Escobar’s killing. First, although not judicially established, 
Escobar’s guilt for killing innocent human beings on numerous 
occasions was never in serious doubt. This, of course, is not 
enough to justify killing him in circumstances other than those 
that allow for the use of deadly force pursuant to law-enforcement 
authority, or defense of self or others. Absent these 
circumstances, there are very powerful reasons militating in 
favor of capturing and trying an individual for his crimes, rather 
than allowing government officials to kill him without affording 
him due process of law. Nevertheless, the fact that Escobar’s guilt 
was clearly established helps explain—along with other factors—
why an order to kill rather than capture him may have been 
justified in this particular case.  
A second factor justifying Escobar’s killing was that he 
clearly remained a dangerous individual with the potential to 
cause massive amounts of harm in the future. Even if it is 
assumed that Escobar did not pose a threat to the life or limb of 
the police officers or third parties at the time he was killed, there 
were good reasons to believe that he would continue to engage in 
serious crimes in the future. Once again, this alone is not enough 
to justify killing Escobar. Many, if not most, people who are guilty 
of committing homicide are dangerous and could thus continue to 
engage in similar conduct in the future. Nonetheless, Escobar’s 
                                                                                                     
 282. See, e.g., supra notes 253–58 and accompanying text (describing actions 
of paramilitary groups). 
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dangerousness was different in kind from that of the typical 
violent felon. Escobar was widely considered during the 1980s 
and up to the time of his death to be the most dangerous drug 
trafficker in the world.283 His crimes were different in scale from 
the offenses committed by ordinary criminals. Before car bombs 
became associated with the Middle East, Escobar used them to 
kill innocent people and terrorize the citizenry.284 
Escobar was complicit in the killing of police officers and 
presidential candidates.285 He was widely believed to have played 
a role in the killing of half of the members of the Colombian 
Supreme Court.286 There was overwhelming evidence suggesting 
that he ordered the downing of a commercial jetliner.287 Escobar 
was no ordinary criminal. And his dangerousness was not 
ordinary either.  
Furthermore, Escobar showed no signs of slowing down, so 
the authorities had every reason to expect his criminal activities 
would continue and that, as a result, so would the body count. His 
death put an end to the bloodbath. Coupled with the fact that 
there was no doubt that Escobar was guilty of past serious 
offenses, the case in favor of neutralizing him by whatever means 
necessary was strong.  
In spite of this, Escobar’s dangerousness could not, in and of 
itself, justify killing him extrajudicially, even though his guilt for 
committing serious offenses was not in doubt. These factors 
clearly provide enough reasons to justify using force—deadly if 
necessary—to capture an individual. They do not, however, 
justify killing a person in a nonconfrontational scenario if it is 
assumed that he could have been neutralized before he was 
                                                                                                     
 283. See id. at 138 (stating that DEA Chief Toft labeled Escobar “the most 
notorious and dangerous cocaine trafficker in history”). 
 284. See id. at 57 (describing Escobar’s attempt to kill a high-ranking 
Colombian general in charge of hunting him down by setting off a car bomb 
alongside his vehicle, wounding numerous civilians). 
 285. See supra notes 226–42, 248–49 and accompanying text (describing 
Escobar’s numerous egregious crimes). 
 286. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (noting that Escobar was 
accused of being responsible for the deaths of multiple Colombian Supreme 
Court Justices). 
 287. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (referencing accusations 
that Escobar downed a commercial airliner as a means to assassinate a 
potential presidential candidate). 
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killed.288 An additional element was present here: the 
unavailability of the traditional justice system as a secure means 
to punish and incapacitate him.  
Trying Escobar was virtually impossible. He had managed to 
render the judiciary ineffective, at least with regard to him, by 
either killing judges who were willing to take a stand against 
him, or by bribing those who would accept the money. 
Furthermore, even if trying him would have been feasible, 
imprisoning him would have been nearly impossible. As his 
escape from La Catedral demonstrated, Escobar was able to get 
to almost anyone in order to have his way, including prison 
guards and government officials. At the time, there appeared no 
way of successfully trying, and subsequently imprisoning, 
Escobar in Colombia. Finally, even if it is assumed, for the sake of 
argument, that Escobar could have been successfully tried and 
imprisoned, there is little reason to doubt that doing so would 
have endangered the lives of those who played a role in the 
process, including the officers who would escort him to and from 
court, the judges who would preside over his trial, and the guards 
who would be in charge of his custody. Additionally, Escobar’s 
trial and imprisonment could very well have endangered the lives 
of civilians who did not play a role in his capture and detention. 
Escobar had shown that he was willing to do anything to get 
what he wanted, and he had no trouble killing innocent people. 
He would not have hesitated to do what he needed to prevent 
trial and imprisonment, even if it meant killing innocents. Given 
this reality, Colombia had strong reasons to avoid paying the 
price involved in capturing and trying Escobar. These factors help 
explain the absence of complaints in Colombia or elsewhere 
following Escobar’s death.  
Despite these considerations, there remains at least one 
troubling aspect of Escobar’s demise, even under an account that 
gives weight to the factors outlined above. This is the reported 
fact that Escobar was already cornered and debilitated at the 
time of his shooting.289 The problem here is similar to the one we 
                                                                                                     
 288. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (noting that Escobar was 
probably neutralized before the fatal shot was fired). 
 289. See Schmidle, supra note 4, at 43 (stating that bin Laden was found 
unarmed).  
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briefly considered with respect to hors de combat status as 
defined in IHL.290 Under the war paradigm, the permissive 
approach to killing ceases upon the target’s incapacitation, 
namely upon his having been rendered unconscious “or otherwise 
incapacitated by wounds or sickness” and being, therefore, 
“incapable of defending himself.”291 This distinction reflects the 
logic of risk—combatants are presumptively dangerous and are 
targetable only so long as that presumption retains plausibility—
but not entirely. The wounded soldier maintains her immunity 
from attack even as she is evacuated to a friendly hospital where 
she may recover to rejoin the fight. Manifest, here, is also a sense 
of chivalry, a moral revulsion against killing the helpless 
irrespective of their potential future danger. 
This applies to the Escobar case, as well. The considerations 
favoring his killing, as we have outlined them, apply whether or 
not he was at large at the time of his targeting. But even if one 
accepts a more permissive approach to lethal force in cases like 
Escobar’s, the killing of a suspect already arrested presents a 
different moral calculus, one in which the use of lethal force 
becomes indefensible, even in the extraordinary circumstances we 
have described. One might also draw the line at the moment of 
Escobar’s incapacitation, when he effectively fell into the power of 
government authorities. 
This qualification, however, is not fatal to the broader claim 
that a more permissive approach to killing was appropriate in 
Escobar’s case. For example, one could object to the specific 
circumstances of his killing while nevertheless maintaining that 
he, like a combatant in armed conflict, was appropriately subject 
to being targeted in a broad set of nonconfrontational scenarios, 
so long as he remained at large. 
V. Pablo Escobar and the Morality of Targeted Killings 
The suggestion that Escobar might have been a justifiable 
TK 4 target presents a prima facie conflict with the limits that 
                                                                                                     
 290. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing hors de combat 
status). 
 291. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 41(c).  
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deeply ingrained principles of criminal law impose on official 
action. In this Part, we discuss how a narrowly drawn TK 4 
justification might be integrated into conventional criminal law 
thinking. In particular, we consider the relationship of this 
justification to limits on preemptive action, punishment 
philosophy, and due process values.  
In addition, we consider whether this justification is 
reducible to a judicially administrable test. We acknowledge that 
there is indeterminacy in the framework we outline, and we 
observe that this indeterminacy is not qualitatively different from 
that already inherent in administering established justifications 
for the use of lethal force. That said, we are mindful that special 
caution is warranted when considering proposals to relax the 
norm against killing, including concerns about official abuse of an 
expanded rule and the risk of creating a slippery slope. If these 
concerns preclude the acceptance of a TK 4 justification within 
the law, our model may nevertheless have value in indicating 
when targeted killings can be tolerated as a matter of social 
morality, even if not technically legal. 
Finally, we qualify our argument by highlighting several 
important questions that arise in the context of targeted killing 
but remain outside the scope of our analysis. 
A. Targeted Killing Partially Justified as Preemptive Action 
Most justifications afford individuals a defense to criminal 
liability when they harm another in order to prevent a future 
harm to self or others. Self-defense is a paradigmatic example. 
The person who employs defensive force takes preemptive action 
in order to avoid harm to his person. Although there is much 
debate about the reasons that justify acting in self-defense in 
borderline cases,292 there is wide agreement about the fact that 
the harm avoided by the defensive action is relevant to explaining 
the justifiable nature of such conduct.293  
                                                                                                     
 292. See George P. Fletcher & Luis E. Chiesa, Self-Defense and the Psychotic 
Aggressor, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 365, 365–72 (Paul H. Robinson, 
Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) (discussing the 
justifications of use of defensive force against the psychotic aggressor). 
 293. See id. at 365 (noting that “it is hard to see either the justice or efficacy 
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The use of deadly force pursuant to law-enforcement 
authority is also morally justified because it prevents a future 
harm. By using such force, police officers prevent harm to 
themselves, harm to others, and the harm inherent in allowing a 
dangerous felon to escape.294 Admittedly, it is debatable whether 
the harm inherent in escaping from police custody is sufficiently 
grave to warrant using deadly force to prevent it.295 Nevertheless, 
once it is accepted that the harm of escaping capture is 
significant enough to justify employing deadly force, it becomes 
clear that the justification for using such force is prospective 
rather than retrospective. The individual is not harmed to exact 
retribution for what he is suspected to have done, or to retaliate 
in response for past wrongdoing, but rather to prevent the 
occurrence of a future harm.  
The use of force pursuant to the lesser-evils defense can be 
morally justified in a similar manner. The reason why it is 
acceptable to cause harm to an innocent person pursuant to this 
defense is that, by doing so, one prevents an even greater harm 
from taking place.296 Once again, the moral justification for 
engaging in this harmful conduct is preemptive because the use 
of force in these circumstances is a way of averting an untoward 
state of affairs that will take place in the future, rather than a 
method for punishing the harmed individual for past behavior. 
Can TK 4 killings be morally justified by appealing to such 
preemptive rationales? There is certainly a preemptive dimension 
to such targeted killings. A salutary consequence of killing a 
manifestly dangerous individual such as Escobar is that doing so 
                                                                                                     
of punishing someone who kills [a deadly attacker] for the sake of self-
preservation”). 
 294. Allowing a suspected felon to escape hinders the effective operation of 
the criminal justice system.  
 295. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(i), (2)(b)(iv)(B) (1962) (restricting 
justifiable use of deadly force by law-enforcement officers to certain situations, 
including arrests for felonies or if “there is a substantial risk that the person to 
be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is 
delayed”).  
 296. See id. § 3.02 (“Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid 
a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm 
or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be 
prevented by the law . . . .”). 
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eliminates the possibility that he will be involved in future 
attacks.297 If the possibility of future attacks is substantial, then 
the prospect of preventing them by killing the actor certainly 
counts in favor of this course of action.  
Nevertheless, this factor alone should not be enough to 
justify the killing of an individual in TK 4 cases. Domestic 
criminal law circumscribes the authorization to use deadly force 
to cases in which the force is necessary to prevent an imminent 
future attack298 or a non-imminent, known future aggression that 
can only be averted by the preemptive use of deadly force.299 
There are good reasons for imposing these strict limitations. 
When the attack is not sufficiently imminent, or there is 
uncertainty about when and if a future aggression will take place, 
it is likely that the conflict may be resolved without using deadly 
force.300 Perhaps the individual will not carry out the attack or 
the police may thwart it without resorting to deadly force. It is a 
generally accepted principle that force calculated to take life 
should only be used when all else fails.301 It is unclear whether 
                                                                                                     
 297. It is worth noting that killing the dangerous individual might also 
generate violence. For example, the associates of the killed individual might 
harm innocent people in order to avenge the death. 
 298. See Ferzan, supra note 167, at 222–23 (noting that the use of deadly 
force in “[d]omestic self-defense is wholly preventative,” but a threat of unlawful 
force must be imminent to “trigger the right to self-defense”). 
 299. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1), (2)(b) (stipulating that the use of 
deadly force is justified if “immediately necessary for the purpose” of protection 
against “death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse” on the 
“present occasion”). 
 300. See Dressler, supra note 171, at 467 (noting the importance of 
“imminency” in self-defense justifications and that, because there is no 
imminence when a battered woman murders her sleeping spouse, “we will never 
know for sure . . . whether some other, less extreme, remedy would have been 
sufficient”). 
 301. This is why deadly force pursuant to self-defense, law-enforcement 
authority, and the lesser-evils defense is only justified when it is necessary to 
prevent a harm. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (authorizing 
the use of deadly force if the law-enforcement officer reasonably believes it is 
necessary to defend himself or others); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985) 
(stating that, under certain circumstances, “[c]onduct that the actor believes to 
be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable”); 
Dressler, supra note 171, at 466 (“Stemming from the common law, a core 
feature of self-defense law is that the life of every person, even that of an 
aggressor, should not be terminated if there is a less extreme way to resolve the 
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using lethal force is necessary in TK 4 cases because the agents 
who order the killing simply do not know with sufficient certainty 
whether the targeted individual is actually planning a future 
attack, one which can only be thwarted by killing the target.302 
Although they might justifiably expect that future attacks will 
take place, that expectation is not enough to authorize the killing 
of a human being.  
This does not mean that the possibility of thwarting a future 
attack is irrelevant to justifying the killing of the targeted 
individual. It surely is. More needs to be demonstrated, however, 
in order to flout the basic principle that a person should not be 
killed unless it is the only way of preventing future harm to the 
lives of others. The likelihood of averting a future attack is, in 
sum, a necessary, but insufficient, condition for justifying a TK 4 
killing. 
B. Targeted Killing Partially Justified as Retaliatory 
(Punitive) Action 
It is sometimes morally justified for the government to inflict 
harm to a non-threatening individual deliberately. Sometimes it 
may even be morally justified for the government to kill a non-
threatening person deliberately.303 The paradigmatic example is 
state-sanctioned punishment.  
Many theories have been advanced to justify the imposition 
of punishment. Consequentialist theories of punishment—such as 
those rooted in deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
justify punishment primarily by reference to the good 
consequences that follow from its imposition.304 Deontological 
theories of punishment—such as retribution—justify punishment 
primarily by reference to the fact that punishing a person who 
                                                                                                     
problem.”). 
 302. In cases of group crime, for example, killing a group’s leader might fail 
to prevent others from carrying out a planned attack. 
 303. This statement, however, assumes that the death penalty is morally 
justified, which is an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 304. See R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 3–4 
(2001) (discussing consequentialism, which “insists that the justification of any 
human practice depends on its actual or expected consequences”). 
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has done something worthy of condemnation is intrinsically good 
even if no additional good consequences follow from doing so.305 In 
spite of their differences, consequentialist and deontological 
approaches to punishment have something important in common. 
Both theories conceive of the imposition of punishment as a 
response to a wrongful act committed by the person to be 
punished.306 Thus, regardless of what is believed to be the aim of 
punishment, it is imposed for an act of wrongdoing that took 
place in the past.307 Otherwise, the imposition of sanctions would 
seem random and arbitrary because punishment is, by definition, 
something that happens only after a determination that the 
person to be punished has committed an offense.308 In other 
words, there is an essential feature of punishment that is 
backward-looking even if its imposition is justified by appealing 
to forward-looking consequentialist criteria.309 Punishment is 
imposed because someone has done something wrong, even if the 
aim of imposing it is to deter others from engaging in similar acts 
in the future or to prevent the offender from recidivating.310  
Can targeted killings in TK 4 cases sometimes be morally 
justified by appealing to reasons that are similar to those that 
                                                                                                     
 305. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 87 (1997) (stating that in 
retributivism “the good that punishment achieves is that someone who deserves 
it gets it”). Furthermore, “[p]unishment of the guilty is thus for the retributivist 
an intrinsic good.” Id. 
 306. See Luis Ernesto Chiesa Aponte, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: 
A Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 102, 109 (2007) 
(explaining that “punishment is imposed for the commission of an act that 
represents an untoward state of affairs”). 
 307. See id. at 113 (“[N]o punishment can be coherently imposed when there 
is no wrongdoing no matter what theory of punishment one espouses.”). 
 308. See id. at 106 (stating that “punishment would simply not make sense 
without wrongdoing”). Furthermore, “imposing punishment without the 
commission of an offense would be akin to the state’s production of random and 
arbitrary violence.” Id. at 110. 
 309. See id. at 109–10 (explaining that the connection between punishment 
and offense “highlights the centrality of the concept of ‘wrongdoing’ in 
explaining the true nature of punishment insofar as it entails inflicting pain 
upon a person for having committed an offense and not just for the sake of social 
protection”).  
 310. See id. at 106–07 (explaining that scholars have agreed over the years 
that punishment is a response to wrongdoing even though the aim of 
punishment varies with different theories).  
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justify the practice of state-sanctioned punishment? Perhaps a 
state-ordered targeted killing is nothing more than an 
extrajudicial way of imposing punishment. This is especially the 
case if it is assumed that the targeted person has committed 
grave crimes in the past.  
The problem with justifying targeted killings in this manner 
is that it runs afoul of the basic principle that the state is not 
allowed to harm an individual for punitive purposes without first 
establishing his guilt in a judicial proceeding. There are many 
sound reasons for that principle. First, we trust the judicial 
process more than any other government process, both in terms of 
providing unbiased outcomes and in terms of providing the best 
forum for discovering the truth. Second, we are skeptical of 
consolidating in one branch of government the power to 
investigate wrongdoing, adjudicate guilt, and carry out sentences. 
We simply do not trust the executive to be judge, jury, and 
executioner. Although it can be argued that judicial proceedings 
are a formality when there is no doubt about the offender’s guilt, 
it is generally best to adhere to such formalities. Making 
exceptions to this rule would rapidly take us down a dangerous, 
slippery slope, which makes it very difficult to tell when a judicial 
proceeding is necessary. 
This does not mean that targeted killings in TK 4 cases do 
not have a punitive dimension or that this feature of the practice 
is irrelevant to explaining its moral justifiability. Certainty about 
past wrongful acts committed by the targeted person is relevant 
to the legitimacy of authorizing his killing. If there is no certainty 
about such matters, it is not legitimate to order the killing. Such 
certainty, however, cannot by itself establish the moral 
legitimacy of orders to kill an individual in a nonconfrontational 
setting. 
C. Targeted Killing Partially Justified Because of Difficulty or 
Dangerousness of Trying the Perpetrator 
Targeted killings in TK 4 cases serve a preemptive function. 
The government protects its citizens when it kills a manifestly 
dangerous individual who is nearly certain to engage in future 
acts of wrongdoing. These killings also serve a punitive function. 
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There are good desert-based and consequentialist-based reasons 
for punishing a person who has engaged in unspeakable crimes. 
Although one would prefer that judicial means be used to 
adjudicate guilt and mete out punishment in such cases, 
achieving justice is not always so easy. Ordering the killings of 
individuals may sometimes be the only available means of doing 
some kind of justice. Nevertheless, morally justifying this 
practice requires more than demonstrating that it serves 
preemptive and punitive functions. In the case of preemptive 
strikes, deadly force is usually authorized only if its use is 
necessary to thwart an imminent attack.311 If there is no 
imminent attack, the use of deadly force is usually not necessary 
and therefore not morally justifiable.312 In the case of punitive 
acts, deadly force is only authorized pursuant to a judicial 
determination of guilt. The rule of law requires no less.  
There are a handful of cases, however, in which ordering the 
use of deadly force in a nonconfrontational setting and without a 
judicial adjudication of guilt becomes more defensible as a 
reasonable and morally acceptable course of action. The cases 
that come to mind involve TK 4 scenarios in which deadly force is 
used in a nonconfrontational setting against a dangerous 
individual who has engaged in serious crimes in the past. The use 
of deadly force appears to be morally justified when trying the 
individual will be either extraordinarily difficult or unacceptably 
dangerous. The difficulty or dangerousness of capturing and 
trying the targeted person is morally relevant to ordering her 
killing because it makes a judicial determination of guilt 
impossible or too risky.  
The difficulties involved in trying the individual can be 
insurmountable, depending on the circumstances. Perhaps the 
individual cannot be apprehended without exposing law 
enforcement or bystanders to excessive risks. The jurisdiction in 
which the individual is going to be tried might not have a 
properly functioning legal system, if it is in a war-torn area, for 
instance. In other cases, despite the existence of a legal system 
                                                                                                     
 311. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing preemptive 
strikes and the requirement of an imminent attack). 
 312. See id. (explaining that deadly force is not necessary without an 
imminent attack during a preemptive strike). 
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that works acceptably in most cases, the trial of a particular 
person or group of persons is not possible for whatever reason.  
This is what happened in the case of Pablo Escobar. 
Although Colombia’s legal system was not entirely dysfunctional, 
it was not properly equipped to deal with the likes of Escobar and 
other top-level drug traffickers.313 As a result of Escobar’s plata o 
plomo policy, there appeared to be no judge in Colombia who 
could preside over his trial.314 Those courageous enough to defy 
him were killed.315 Those who were not as courageous were 
bought off by Escobar.316 By the late 1980s, it was obvious that 
the Colombian judiciary did not have the tools necessary to try a 
man as ruthless and dangerous as Escobar.317 
In addition, trying the individual could sometimes be 
unwarranted because, although logistically feasible, doing so 
would prove unacceptably dangerous. It is important to note the 
risks inherent in detaining and trying the suspect would need to 
be extraordinarily high before contemplating an extrajudicial 
killing.  
It is not enough, in our view, to claim that trying the 
targeted individual might jeopardize the lives of innocent people. 
Speculative harm, even probable harm, is not enough to justify 
dispensing with due process. One would have to know to a 
substantial certainty that trying the targeted individual would 
cause significant harm to innocent parties. It would also be 
necessary to know to a substantial certainty that the harms 
inherent in trying the individual would significantly outweigh the 
harms inherent in killing him.  
                                                                                                     
 313. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 51 (explaining that Pablo Escobar, 
through his power and popularity, was able to buy off and threaten the 
Colombian court system). 
 314. See id. (stating Escobar’s plata o plomo strategy became so effective by 
1984 that Escobar became untouchable to the courts, and Colombia’s democracy 
was undermined).  
 315. See id. at 53 (stating that by the end of 1986 there were few judges 
alive who defied Escobar’s plata o plomo strategy). 
 316. See id. at 52 (stating that Escobar was responsible for the deaths of at 
least thirty judges). 
 317. See id. at 53 (discussing that by the late 1980s the drug cartel had 
taken over and “Colombia had been corrupted and terrorized to its core”). 
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This last qualification is essential, given that every course of 
action generates certain kinds of benefits and costs. Although 
killing the individual could have the salutary consequence of 
stopping some violence, it could also generate significant societal 
costs inherent in not observing due process. It might also 
generate retaliatory bloodshed. On the other hand, trying the 
individual could have the positive effect of enhancing the 
perceived legitimacy of imposing punishment on the individual. It 
might, however, generate negative consequences, such as 
kidnappings, suicide bombings, and other terrorist attacks 
orchestrated by the detainee’s supporters intent on securing his 
release.  
In sum, regardless of the specific costs and benefits that 
attach to either killing or trying the individual, killing in a TK 4 
case should not be permissible unless it is known with 
substantial certainty that the risks inherent in capturing and 
trying the individual are extraordinarily high and significantly 
greater than the risks inherent in killing without trial. Because 
the right to due process of law is crucial to maintaining a 
legitimate and just system of criminal justice, this right must 
always be observed, except in the most extraordinary of 
circumstances, when killing without capture and trial is 
necessary to avoid certain and significant harm to innocent 
human beings.  
Escobar’s case is again a case on point. Even if logistically 
feasible, trying Escobar was unacceptably dangerous. The 
government was acutely aware of this because an organization 
known as “Los Extraditables” publicly vowed to kill any judge 
who dared try Escobar for murder.318 It also threatened to kill the 
families of those who wanted to indict Escobar in the local 
courts.319 Escobar’s supporters were also known for kidnapping 
innocent people whom he would then use as bargaining chips to 
obtain what he wanted from the government.320 There was, 
                                                                                                     
 318. See id. at 55 (revealing that, when a judge had attempted to indict 
Pablo Escobar for murder, Los Extraditables threatened to kill the judge and his 
family). 
 319. See id. (“We are capable of executing you at any place on this 
planet . . . in the meantime, you will see the fall, one by one, of all the members 
of your family.”).  
 320. See id. (detailing how supporters of Pablo Escobar kidnapped “the 
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therefore, reason to expect with some certainty that kidnappings 
would have increased had Escobar been caught and detained for 
trial. Escobar had also successfully escaped from prison the one 
time he had been detained.321 He would surely have attempted to 
do so again, and he had demonstrated an ability to kill those who 
might stand in his way.  
Asking for a judicial determination of guilt in cases like 
Escobar’s is quixotic. Sometimes a legal system is not equipped to 
make the necessary determinations, and setting the judicial 
wheels in motion is likely to trigger a series of events that 
endanger so many innocent people that it is better not to proceed. 
Circumstances such as these do not occur often. But when they 
do, ordering the extrajudicial killing of the individual might not 
only be sensible but also morally justifiable.  
D. Justifiable Targeted Killings in TK 4 Cases—In Search 
of a Test 
The TK 4 justification we have outlined centers on three 
criteria, all present in the Escobar case. First, an extrajudicial 
killing in a TK 4 case should only be authorized if the targeted 
individual is likely to carry out, or to substantially help carry out, 
atrocities in the future. There need not be proof of an imminent 
attack that is being planned by the individual, but there must be 
an expectation, grounded on specific and articulable facts, that 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a future attack 
on innocent human beings is likely, even if its occurrence is not 
absolutely certain. Furthermore, the future attacks must be of a 
particularly grave nature that transcends the commission of a 
discrete offence. As a general rule, the attack must be part of 
some widespread or systematic campaign. Future large-scale 
terrorist attacks surely satisfy this standard. A typical robbery or 
murder will not.  
                                                                                                     
journalist son of a former president and Conservative candidate for mayor of 
Bogotá”).  
 321. See id. at 107–55 (describing the details of Escobar’s escape from 
prison). 
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Second, there must be no reasonable doubt about the 
targeted individual’s responsibility for past atrocities. This 
requirement is often satisfied because the targeted individual has 
publicly taken responsibility for such atrocities.  
Third, the capture and trial of the individual must be 
logistically impossible or extraordinarily dangerous. As we 
discussed in the previous subpart, this standard is limited to 
exceptional circumstances and will seldom be satisfied because 
there is a very strong presumption in favor of affording the 
targeted individual the due process of law. The legal system must 
be unavailable to try the individual because it is not functioning, 
because it is impossible to try the specific individual for reasons 
such as the killing and intimidation of those judges willing to try 
the targeted individual, or because capture and trial would 
involve a substantial certainty of harm to innocent parties—a 
harm that significantly outweighs the harms inherent in killing 
the individual. 
Even if one accepts, in principle, that certain killings meeting 
the above criteria can be morally justified, distinct concerns 
center on the desirability of reducing these factors to a legal test. 
It may be objected, for example, that the factors we have outlined 
fail to provide sufficient guidance in concrete cases and are 
resistant to judicial application (assuming that judicial review is 
available), thus exposing the law to a slippery slope. There is also 
the potential for governmental abuse, in which the TK 4 
justification is invoked to legitimize killings that do not rightfully 
fall within the narrow exception we have outlined.322 
As a general matter, it is difficult—if not impossible—to craft 
a bright-line test for determining when the killing of a human 
being should be justified. Even in easy cases, such as self-defense, 
the general parameters of the justification are crafted in 
relatively vague terms that allow for some leeway in the 
application of the rule. Thus, we say that using deadly force in 
self-defense is justified if such force was reasonably believed to be 
necessary to avert an imminent and unlawful aggression, and 
only if such force was proportional to the threatened harm.323 The 
                                                                                                     
 322. See Waldron, supra note 71, at 5–9 (discussing bad faith examples of 
targeted killing). 
 323. See Dressler, supra note 171, at 461 (stating that the traditional rule 
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precise scope of the italicized terms is rather fuzzy, especially in 
borderline cases. Is the reasonable belief to be judged from an 
impartial perspective that does not take into account the 
experience and physical and mental attributes of the actor, or 
should it be judged according to what would appear reasonable in 
light of the specific traits and experience of the individual? Is the 
force used by the actor necessary only if it is the sole available 
means to avert the threat, or is it necessary as long as the actor is 
unaware of other means that may also defuse the threat? Does a 
threat to use force within the next five minutes count as an 
“imminent” threat, or does the defender need to wait several 
minutes until the force is about to be employed? Is a threat 
unlawful if it violates any law or regulation regardless of whether 
it is civil, administrative, or criminal law, or is it unlawful only if 
it violates some particular body of law (criminal or tort law, for 
example)? Finally, is force lawful only if it is strictly proportional 
to the harm threatened, or is some degree of disproportionality 
allowed?324  
Determining whether deadly force is lawful pursuant to other 
justification defenses is equally problematic. Consider the case of 
deadly force used pursuant to law-enforcement authority. As a 
general rule, such force is only lawful if it is necessary to prevent 
the escape of a fleeing felon that poses a threat to the lives of the 
officer or third parties.325 Furthermore, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court pointed out in Scott v. Harris, deadly force used by law-
enforcement agents comports with Fourth Amendment standards 
only if the use of such force was reasonable given the dangerous 
                                                                                                     
for self-defense “is that self-protective force can only be used to repel an ongoing 
unlawful attack or what the defender reasonably believes is an imminent 
unlawful assault”). Furthermore, the “use of deadly force is not 
justifiable . . . unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect 
himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse 
compelled by force or threat.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (2010). 
 324. This is an under-studied question in American criminal law. It would 
seem that self-defense allows for the use of disproportionate force as long as it is 
not grossly disproportionate. For example, in every jurisdiction one may use 
deadly force to avert serious bodily injury, although the force used causes more 
harm (death) than the threatened harm (grave bodily injury). Similarly, it 
would seem that one may use deadly force to thwart rape. 
 325. See supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text (discussing what force 
is necessary to use for law enforcement in the case of a fleeing felon). 
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circumstances.326 Although perhaps necessary, the vagueness of 
this approach is evident.  
Given that the parameters for using deadly force are fuzzy 
even in the case of well-established justification defenses, such as 
self-defense and law-enforcement authority, it should come as no 
surprise that we have not provided a bright-line test for 
authorizing targeted killings. It is simply impossible, in this 
context, to come up with something other than general guidelines 
that frame the relevant issues that ought to be considered when 
assessing the justifiability of targeted killings in TK 4 cases.  
Although admittedly fuzzy, the framework proposed here 
does not strike us as being significantly vaguer or more 
problematic than the general frameworks that are currently in 
place to assess the justified nature of force used pursuant to self-
defense and law-enforcement authority. 
We further acknowledge the possibility—indeed probability—
that some governments will abuse a legal doctrine establishing a 
justification along the lines we have set forth. Once again, 
however, this problem is ever-present and not unique to the 
particular context of our analysis. A government wishing to abuse 
its authority under the cloak of the law already has ample room 
to do so within existing accepted legal doctrines, for example, by 
manufacturing claims of self-defense to justify what is in fact an 
impermissible extrajudicial killing. Indeed, we suspect this would 
typically be the easier path, considering the strictness of the 
factors we have offered. The question, therefore, is not whether 
governments would seek to abuse a new legal doctrine justifying 
a limited number of TK 4 cases, but whether the establishment of 
such a doctrine would be uniquely susceptible to abuse. We doubt 
that it is. 
Nevertheless, we are mindful of the sensitivity and caution 
that is warranted whenever contemplating any expansion of the 
legal permission to kill. We therefore have our doubts about the 
advisability of adopting our framework as law, but it may 
nevertheless have value as a measure of social morality. In other 
words, even if the law does not itself justify any TK 4 killings, 
                                                                                                     
 326. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–84 (2007) (stating that the 
officer’s actions were reasonable considering the high likelihood, although not 
certainty, of danger from the fleeing motorist’s driving). 
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those that meet the criteria we have outlined will receive a de 
facto public justification. In this sense, our framework has 
descriptive value: it identifies circumstances in which TK 4 
killings, whether or not legally permitted by codified law, will 
receive broad public acceptance and prove resistant to official 
scrutiny. 
E. Some Qualifications 
The criteria we have identified provide, in our view, the best 
justification for using lethal force in a TK 4 case. It is important 
to acknowledge, however, several points that further qualify and 
limit our framework.  
First, we do not address the threats to international security 
that can result from targeted killings that cross international 
borders. In suggesting that Colombian authorities may have been 
justified in using lethal force to neutralize Escobar in a 
nonconfrontational setting,327 we do not suggest that the United 
States, for example, could have invoked the same justification to 
deploy agents into Colombian territory to target Escobar without 
the consent of Colombian authorities. Whether and when the 
interests justifying a TK 4 targeting might likewise justify a 
cross-border intervention is an important question that remains 
outside the scope of this Article. 
Second, we do not maintain that the interests justifying a TK 
4 targeting might likewise justify the expected incidental loss of 
innocent life, as is permitted, for example, by the IHL 
proportionality test that applies to the conduct of armed 
conflict.328 Our framework instead presumes the continued force 
of the general criminal law rule dictating that governmental 
agents may not knowingly take innocent life even if doing so is 
the only way of killing or capturing a fleeing felon or an otherwise 
dangerous individual.329 Whether or not extraordinary 
                                                                                                     
 327. See supra Part IV (discussing the Escobar case). 
 328. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing the 
proportionality requirement). 
 329. See supra Part III.D (providing the law-enforcement defense). 
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circumstances might justify relaxing this rule is a matter we do 
not consider.330  
Finally, we emphasize that the three-part test we have 
identified requires an individualized assessment of the targeted 
individual. For example, an individual targeted based solely on 
her membership in a group that meets our criteria only on a 
collective basis would fall outside the framework. For the criteria 
to apply, they must be met on an individualized basis. 
VI. The Killing of Osama bin Laden as Self-Defense or 
Law Enforcement 
With this framework in mind, we now return to the killing of 
Osama bin Laden and consider whether justifications other than 
that provided by IHL might apply. 
A. Was bin Laden’s Killing Justified Pursuant to Self-Defense? 
Assuming, for present purposes, that IHL is inapplicable, 
might bin Laden’s killing nevertheless have been justified as an 
act of self-defense? Of course, the answer depends on what 
exactly transpired the day of his killing. If he was in fact armed, 
or if he fired at members of the Navy SEAL team that raided his 
compound, his killing would amount to a justifiable act of defense 
of self or others.  
Matters become more complicated, however, if one assumes—
as some reports indicate331—that bin Laden was unarmed and did 
not threaten physical violence. In that event, killing is not as 
easily justified as an act of self-defense. The reason for this is 
simple. The use of force in self-defense is triggered by the use or 
threat of unlawful force.332 The unlawful aggression must also be 
                                                                                                     
 330. For an analysis of this question as applied to the defense of self and 
others, see Chiesa, supra note 306. 
 331. See, e.g., Schmidle, supra note 4, at 43 (stating that bin Laden was 
unarmed). 
 332. See FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 64, at 89 (explaining that it would 
be “hard to find a national statute on self-defense that failed to require that the 
attack be unlawful”). 
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imminent.333 If bin Laden was unarmed and not about to attack 
the SEAL team, there would have been no imminent wrongful 
aggression to trigger the right to use defensive force.  
It should be noted, however, that the absence of an imminent 
and wrongful aggression is not in and of itself fatal to a claim of 
self-defense. Bin Laden’s killing would also be justified in self-
defense if the shooter acted upon a reasonable belief that bin 
Laden was about to attack them.334 The reasonable belief would 
justify the killing even if the belief happened to be mistaken.335 
This is, in fact, one of the arguments advanced by U.S. officials in 
defense of the bin Laden killing.336 
But what if one assumes that it was unreasonable for the 
SEAL team to believe that bin Laden was about to launch an 
attack? Of course, we will likely never know whether such a belief 
was reasonable or not for the SEALs to hold. For that matter, we 
may never know whether individual members of the team 
subjectively believed that bin Laden was a threat. For all we 
know, the question may have played no role in the operation 
because the team members were acting under rules of 
engagement derived from IHL. Thus, it is worth asking whether 
the killing of bin Laden would have been justified even if the 
SEALs did not believe that their lives were in danger at the time.  
                                                                                                     
 333. See id. at 90–91 (explaining that most jurisdictions require an unlawful 
attack to be imminent to justify self-defense). 
 334. See, e.g., supra note 181 and accompanying text (describing one state’s 
self-defense law, which requires reasonable belief); People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 
41, 49 (N.Y. 1986) (applying the test that a sufficient basis to use deadly force is 
justified if “the situation justified the defendant as a reasonable man in 
believing that he was about to be murderously attacked”). 
 335. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 48 (emphasizing that if a reasonable belief is 
established, then “deadly force could be justified . . . even if the actor’s beliefs as 
to the intentions of another turned out to be wrong”).  
 336. See Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Osama Bin Laden Was Unarmed 
During Navy SEAL Raid, Says White House, HUFFINGTON POST, May 3, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/03/osama-bin-laden-unarmed-during-
raid_n_857257.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (quoting CIA Director Leon 
Panetta as asserting that the SEALs fired because bin Laden made “some 
threatening moves . . . that clearly represented a clear threat to our guys”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Self-defense is off the table if this assumption is made. A 
person’s lack of an objectively reasonable belief that his life or the 
life of another is in danger is fatal to a claim of self-defense.337 
The same would be true under an expanded version of self-
defense. Even if we assume that the U.S. government possessed 
credible and specific information that bin Laden was going to 
launch an attack against American interests in the near future, 
the killing could not be justified as an instance of preemptive self-
defense unless killing was the only way to prevent the attack.338 
This requirement could not be met under the circumstances if bin 
Laden were readily susceptible to capture. Moreover, absent the 
type of specific information we have just hypothesized, mere 
speculation about possible attacks that bin Laden might launch 
in the future would not be enough to justify killing him pursuant 
to the standard arguments favoring preemptive self-defense.339 
B. Was bin Laden’s Killing Justified Pursuant to Law-
Enforcement Authority or the Lesser-Evils Defense? 
Governmental agents may on occasion use more force in 
furtherance of law-enforcement authority than they may use 
pursuant to self-defense or defense of others. Although deadly 
force in defense of self or others may only be employed in order to 
deflect an imminent aggression, police officers may sometimes 
use lethal force in order to prevent a fleeing felon from escaping 
even if, at the time the force is used, the felon is not threatening 
imminent harm.340 This defense, as Finkelstein has persuasively 
argued, may thus justify certain killings in circumstances in 
which traditional self-defense is inapplicable.341 Can it be invoked 
to justify bin Laden’s killing?  
                                                                                                     
 337. See Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 48 (stating that for self-defense to be justified, 
there must “be a reasonable basis, viewed objectively, for the beliefs”).  
 338. See supra Part III.C (explaining the elements of an expanded version of 
self-defense). 
 339. See supra Part III.C (explaining the elements of an expanded version of 
self-defense). 
 340. See, e.g., supra Part III.D (describing when law-enforcement agents 
may use deadly force against felons). 
 341. See supra notes 196–97 (discussing Claire Finkelstein’s theory that 
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Again, the answer to this question depends on the 
circumstances surrounding the killing. If bin Laden was 
attempting to flee, then the SEAL team members might have 
been justified in using deadly force to prevent his escape. On the 
other hand, if the SEALs fired at bin Laden without first 
attempting to arrest him, or if bin Laden did not attempt escape, 
conventional law-enforcement authority could not supply a 
justification for the use of deadly force. 
Assuming that bin Laden was not armed when he was killed 
and that he did not threaten harm, the choice-of-evils or necessity 
defense would likewise fail: necessity may only be invoked to 
justify a use of force that is necessary to prevent an imminent 
harm from taking place.342 Once again, bin Laden’s dangerous 
character does not by itself justify using deadly force against him. 
The use of force pursuant to necessity, like self-defense, is 
triggered by the threat of suffering imminent harm, not by the 
possibility that a dangerous individual will try to cause harm in 
the future.  
C. Was bin Laden’s Killing Otherwise Justifiable? 
Assuming that bin Laden’s killing was not supported by a 
reasonable belief that he threatened to harm the SEAL team 
members, it becomes difficult to justify by appealing to the 
conventionally accepted justification defenses recognized under 
domestic law. Might bin Laden’s killing be an instance of a TK 4 
case, in which ordering the killing of an unarmed and non-
threatening individual is nevertheless justifiable?  
The case is similar in some aspects to Escobar’s case. First, 
bin Laden had publicly taken responsibility for engaging in 
unspeakable crimes.343 There was thus no doubt about his 
                                                                                                     
targeted killings might be legally justified pursuant to the law-enforcement 
authority to use deadly force). 
 342. See supra Part III.E (explaining the elements of the necessity defense 
for use of force). 
 343. See Bin Laden Claims Responsibility for 9/11, CBC NEWS, Oct. 29, 
2004, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2004/10/29/binladen_message041029. 
html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (announcing that bin Laden officially and 
publicly claimed “direct responsibility for the 2001 attacks against the United 
States”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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responsibility for the death of thousands of innocent human 
beings. As a result, trying him would have been, in a sense, a 
formality. Although perhaps deemed necessary to uphold the rule 
of law, bin Laden’s trial would not really be necessary to establish 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Second, bin Laden, like Escobar, was the head of a very 
dangerous organization that was still operating at the time of his 
killing. We had (and still have) good reasons to believe that al 
Qaeda will attempt to kill innocent people in the future.344 As a 
result, bin Laden’s killing could be viewed as serving both 
punitive and preventive functions. On the one hand, his killing 
could be construed as punishment for his past crimes. On the 
other, his killing could prevent crime by helping debilitate al 
Qaeda’s command structure. 
In a typical case, these considerations are insufficient to 
justify killing a non-threatening individual. As a general rule, 
deadly force should only be authorized in order to defuse an 
imminent threat or pursuant to a sentence secured after 
affording the individual the due process of law.345 As Escobar’s 
case demonstrates, however, extrajudicially killing the individual 
may be a reasonable course of action, even assuming capture is 
feasible, if trying him is either impossible or unacceptably 
dangerous. This is where significant differences arise between 
Escobar’s case and bin Laden’s.  
First, it is difficult to argue that trying bin Laden would have 
been logistically impossible. The United States certainly has the 
resources to orchestrate trials of dangerous individuals. Although 
setting up a fair trial for bin Laden might have been difficult and 
costly, there is no doubt that it would have been feasible.  
Second, it is speculative to assume that the dangers 
associated with capturing and trying bin Laden would have been 
sufficiently high to justify dispensing with a trial. Of course, 
trying bin Laden would have posed certain risks. For instance, 
                                                                                                     
 344. See Obama, supra note 1 (“[The United States] quickly learned that the 
9/11 attacks were carried out by al Qaeda—an organization headed by Osama 
bin Laden, which had openly declared war on the United States and was 
committed to killing innocents in our country and around the globe.”). 
 345. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text (explaining that deadly 
force is usually authorized in cases when the force is necessary to prevent an 
imminent future attack). 
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his capture and trial might have prompted retaliatory terrorist 
attacks or put American citizens at risk of being kidnapped and 
used as bargaining chips to gain his release. This is a risk that 
Colombian authorities had to ponder when deciding whether to 
capture and try Escobar.346 Although these concerns should not 
be trivialized, one can only speculate with regard to the likelihood 
that they would actually materialize. Also, it is quite possible 
that the risks inherent in killing bin Laden were as significant as 
the risks inherent in capturing and trying him. The risk of 
retaliatory attacks, for example, exists under either scenario. 
We do not believe these risks suffice to justify dispensing 
with a trial in bin Laden’s case. The decision to order the 
extrajudicial killing of an individual should not be taken lightly, 
and speculative assessments of the dangerousness of trying the 
actor should not justify taking such momentous action.  
At the same time, however, we believe that the reasons that 
undergird our theory of justifiable killings in TK 4 cases may 
explain public intuitions about the bin Laden killing better than 
the reasons associated with the other available justifications for 
targeted killings. That is, many people seem to believe that 
killing bin Laden was the right thing to do because he was a 
dangerous individual, he was responsible for mass atrocities, and 
trying him would be a complicated affair. This helps explain why 
President Obama asserted that “justice has been done” when bin 
Laden was killed.347 This assertion does not sound like the 
language of preventive self-defense or law-enforcement authority. 
It does not sound like the language of national self-defense either. 
The American ideal is that justice is meted out in the courtroom 
after observing due process and judicially establishing the 
defendant’s guilt. A killing in individual or national self-defense 
is not a way to do justice, but rather a way to defuse a threat. The 
language originally used by President Obama to describe the 
killing did not fit this preventive paradigm. Similarly, most 
Americans who celebrated bin Laden’s death described it as 
something that provided them with some “sense of closure.”348 
                                                                                                     
 346. See supra note 320 and accompanying text (discussing that Escobar 
kidnapped innocent people to threaten legal authorities). 
 347. Obama, supra note 1. 
 348. See, e.g., David Jackson, Bush on Bin Laden: ‘A Sense of Closure,’ USA 
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But closure has nothing to do with self-defense. Closure is what 
one feels after justice has been done.  
What the President tapped into, we believe, was a deeply felt 
and widely shared intuition that some extrajudicial killings that 
do not squarely fit within the self-defense or law-enforcement 
paradigms may nevertheless be justified for both preventive and 
retributive reasons. This is the same intuition underlying the 
widespread agreement regarding the justifiability of Pablo 
Escobar’s killing. Escobar’s killing appeared morally acceptable, 
even if not in self-defense or pursuant to law-enforcement 
authority, because he was dangerous and he was undoubtedly 
responsible for past atrocities of an incredible scale. This is why 
his death provided a sense of closure for Colombians. Escobar’s 
killing—like bin Laden’s—was a way of preventing possible 
future attacks, but it was also a way of doing some justice.  
Accordingly, and unlike the war paradigm, this account 
provides a superior explanation of why one might defend a more 
tolerant approach to justifying killing—an approach that does not 
require the feasibility of capture—in cases that do not share the 
functional requirements generally associated with war. To the 
extent that governments turn to targeted killing in this context, 
there is value to considering such cases on their own terms, 
rather than stretching IHL to contexts far removed from the 
battlefield realities that led to IHL’s creation. 
The problem with the Escobar analogy, as we have argued, is 
that it was both logistically impossible and extraordinarily 
dangerous for Colombians to try Escobar. Nevertheless, it 
appears that it was logistically possible and not unacceptably 
dangerous to try bin Laden. Therefore, although feelings of 
closure and justice are understandable responses to the killing of 
a dangerous individual and a mass killer, bin Laden’s 
extrajudicial killing is difficult to justify under the residual 
justification that explains the moral propriety of certain TK 4 
killings. Retributive and preventive reasons are necessary, but 
not sufficient, conditions to authorize an extrajudicial killing. In 
                                                                                                     
TODAY, July 27, 2011, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/ 
2011/07/-bush-on-bin-ladena-sense-of-closure/1#.T_GxjI5kiFY (last visited Sept. 
24, 2012) (describing the public reaction to the death of bin Laden) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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addition, it must be clear that trying the targeted individual is 
not feasible. If bin Laden could have been tried, due process 
should have been observed. Accordingly, although we have 
suggested that some targeted killings may be justifiable even if 
they fall outside the traditional defenses supplied by IHL and the 
criminal law, the bin Laden case does not appear to fall within 
this narrowly defined category. 
VII. Conclusion 
As we observed at the outset of this Article, the aim of our 
analysis is not to find a definitive answer to the legality of the bin 
Laden killing. Depending on circumstances that may never be 
known, the killing may have been readily justifiable even under 
the rules generally applicable to law-enforcement operations. If, 
for example, the killing resulted from a reasonable belief that bin 
Laden posed an imminent threat that could be defused only 
through the immediate use of lethal force, then the killing was 
justified as a classic case of self-defense or defense of others. 
Our interest in the bin Laden case focuses instead on the 
legal landscape of targeted killing and asks whether the killing 
might be justified under a more permissive legal regime, one that 
relaxes the restrictions generally imposed by criminal law. Public 
statements of government officials have identified such a regime 
in the rules applicable to killing in wartime. We have raised 
questions about that account. Although there is much about 
IHL’s requirements that is indeterminate and debatable, we have 
argued that the best reading of IHL (assuming this law applies to 
non-battlefield scenarios, such as the bin Laden killing) is 
inconsistent with the view that bin Laden remained a proper 
target even if capture was feasible under the circumstances.  
We have further considered whether some targeted killings 
might be acceptable, even if not supported by IHL, by the 
conventional justification defenses generally afforded to law-
enforcement officials, or by more expansive models of preemptive 
self-defense. We have identified, in the case of Pablo Escobar, a 
best-case scenario for a rule that does not hinge on the existence 
of an armed conflict and, unlike IHL, emphasizes culpability 
considerations alongside preventive considerations. If the 
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Escobar case can supply such a standard, it is a narrow one: in 
addition to demanding that such killings be justified by 
compelling evidence, both of the target’s undeniable guilt for 
grave atrocities and of compelling evidence that killing will 
thwart serious future crimes, we argue that this category of 
targeted killings should only be allowed when it is not feasible to 
detain or try the individual because doing so would be logistically 
impossible or extraordinarily dangerous.  
We have also argued that the bin Laden killing, considering 
the apparent feasibility of trial, does not fall within this narrow 
category of cases. Nevertheless, the model we have outlined 
retains explanatory power. It provides, we suspect, the best 
account of the public understanding of bin Laden’s demise, one in 
which his killing was an act of justice, and not merely the 
neutralization of a wartime opponent. More broadly, we believe 
that the criteria we have outlined identify circumstances in which 
similar operations are likely to receive public legitimation even if 
they fail de jure requirements. 
